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The  Neoclassical  Revival 
in  Growth  Economics:  Has  It  Gone 
Too  Far? 
1. Introduction 
Theories endogenizing  a country's technology,  such as Romer (1990) and 
Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991),  arose  from  the  desire  to  explain  the 
enormous  disparity of levels and growth rates of per capita output across 
countries.  The belief was  that differences  in physical and human capital 
intensity  were  not  up  to  the  quantitative  task.  This  belief  has  been 
shaken by a series of recent empirical studies.  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992) estimate  that the Solow model augmented  to include human capi- 
tal can explain  78% of the cross-country  variance of output per capita in 
1985. Alwyn  Young (1994, 1995) finds  that the East Asian growth  mira- 
cles  were  fueled  more  by  growth  in  labor and  capital  than  by  rising 
productivity.  And  Barro and  Sala-i-Martin (1995) show  that  the  aug- 
mented  Solow  model  is consistent  with  the speed  of convergence  they 
estimate  across  countries  as  well  as  across  regions  within  the  United 
States, Japan, and a number of European countries.1 
In our view  these  studies  constitute  a neoclassical  revival.2  They suggest 
We are grateful  to Ben Bemanke, Mark  Bils, V. V. Chari,  Chad Jones, Greg Mankiw,  Ed 
Prescott,  David Romer,  Julio  Rotemberg,  Jim  Schmitz,  Nancy  Stokey,  and Alwyn Young  for 
helpful comments. 
1. Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil, and Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  do not explain the source of 
country  differences  in investment  rates. Chari,  Kehoe, and McGrattan  (1996)  argue  that 
distortions  such as tax rates, bribes, risk of expropriation,  and corruption  contribute  to 
an effective tax rate  which, if it varies  in the right  (stochastic)  way across  countries,  can 
explain the levels and growth rates of income observed  in the Summers-Heston  (1991) 
panel. 
2. We are indebted to Alwyn Young  for this phrase. 74 *  KLENOW  & RODRIGUEZ-CLARE 
that the level and growth  rate of productivity is roughly the same across 
countries,  so  that  differences  in  output  levels  and  growth  rates  are 
largely due  to differences  in physical  and human  capital. Romer (1993), 
in contrast,  argues  that "idea gaps" are much more important than "ob- 
ject gaps." In terms of a simplified production function Y = AX, where A 
is  productivity  and  X  encompasses  physical  and  human  capital,  this 
debate is over the relative importance of A and X. 
This debate matters because the positive and normative implications of 
the A view  can differ dramatically from those of the X view. Technology- 
based  models  of A exhibit scale effects because of the nonrival nature of 
technology  creation and adoption.  And they suggest  that openness,  per- 
haps  though  its effect  on  technology  diffusion,  can have  first-order ef- 
fects on living  standards  and growth  rates (without  requiring big differ- 
ences  in rates of return to capital). These implications of openness  could 
be positive  in all countries,  as in Rodriguez-Clare  (1997), or positive  in 
some and negative  in others, as in Stokey (1991) and Young (1991). These 
implications  are  not  shared  by  the  basic  neoclassical  growth  model, 
which  has the same technology  everywhere. 
In this  paper  we  offer  new  evidence  relevant  to  this  debate  on  the 
importance  of productivity  vs.  physical and human capital in explaining 
international  differences  in levels  and growth rates of output.  In Section 
2 we reexamine  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil's (hereafter MRW) methodol- 
ogy for estimating  human  capital. We update their data and add data on 
primary and tertiary schooling  which  have become  available since their 
study. Because primary school attainment varies much less across coun- 
tries than  secondary  school  attainment  does,  the resulting  estimates  of 
human  capital vary much less across countries than the MRW estimates. 
We also incorporate  evidence  suggesting  that the production  of human 
capital is more labor-intensive  and less physical capital-intensive  than is 
the production  of other goods.  This further narrows country differences 
in estimated  human  capital stocks. 
In Section 3 we incorporate evidence  that pins down  the human  capi- 
tal intensity  of  production  and  the  relative  importance  of primary vs. 
secondary  schooling.  We exploit information contained in Mincer regres- 
sions,  commonly  run in the  labor literature,  on  the amount  of human 
capital gained  from each year of schooling.  For a cross section  of work- 
ers, Mincer (1974) ran a regression  of worker log wages  on worker years 
of schooling  and  experience.  Such regressions  have  since been  run for 
many countries (see Bils and Klenow, 1996, for citations for 48 countries). 
We combine  this evidence  with  data on  schooling  attainment  and esti- 
mates  of  school  quality  to  produce  measures  of  human  capital for 98 
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that  productivity  differences  account  for half  or more  of level  differences 
in  1985  GDP  per  worker.3 
In Section  4 we  carry out  the  same  analysis  as in Section  3, but  here  the 
objective  is  to  produce  1960-1985  growth  rates  rather  than  1985  levels. 
We  find  that  differences  in  productivity  growth  explain  the  overwhelm- 
ing  majority  of growth  rate  differences.  These  results  seem  at odds  with 
Young  (1994,  1995),  so in Section  5 we  compare  and  contrast  our findings 
for  98  countries  with  his  careful  findings  for  four  East  Asian  countries. 
Hall  and  Jones  (1996)  also  follow  Bils  and  Klenow  (1996)  in  using 
Mincer  regression  evidence  to construct  human  capital  stocks.  As  we  do, 
they  find  that  productivity  differences  are important  in explaining  inter- 
national  income  variation.4  Their  main  objective  is  different  from  ours, 
however,  in  that  they  are  interested  in  finding  correlates  (such  as  lan- 
guage  and  climate)  with  productivity  differences.  In  contrast,  we  focus 
on  examining  how  human  capital  should  be  measured  and  how  interna- 
tional  productivity  differences  depend  on  how  human  capital  is  mea- 
sured.  We  want  to  know,  for  instance,  whether  our  measure  of  human 
capital  is  more  appropriate  than  the  one  used  by  MRW,  and  we  want  to 
know  how  adding  experience  and  correcting  for schooling  quality  affects 
the  results  on  productivity.  Our  paper  also  differs  from  Hall  and  Jones 
(1996)  in  that  we  study  growth-rate  differences  as  well  as  level  differ- 
ences,  whereas  they  concentrate  on  level  differences.5 
3. OLS Mincer-equation  estimates  of the wage  gain from each additional year of schooling 
might  be too generous  because  of oft-cited ability bias (more able people  acquire more 
education).  In the  NLSY over  1979-1993,  we  ran a Mincer regression  of log  (deflated 
wage)  on schooling,  experience,  and experience  squared and found  a schooling  coeffi- 
cient of 9.3% (s.e.  0.1%). When  we  included  the AFQT score as a proxy for ability, the 
estimated  wage  gain from each year of schooling  fell to 6.8% (s.e.  0.2%). We stick with 
the standard estimates  such as 9.3% for two reasons: first, since we will find that the role 
of human  capital is smaller than MRW found,  we prefer to err on the side of overstating 
variation in human capital across countries; second,  the AFQT score could be a function 
of  human  capital  investments  in  the  home,  and  the  overstated  return  may  crudely 
capture how  these  investments  tend to be higher when  attainment is higher. 
4. Hall and Jones reach quantitatively  similar conclusions  to ours because of two offsetting 
differences.  First, as we will describe in Section 2 below, we take into account the natural 
effect  of higher  TFP on  the  capital-labor  ratio (which  increases  to keep  the  return on 
capital at its steady-state  equilibrium level) and therefore attribute the whole  effect (i.e., 
higher  TFP plus  resulting  higher  capital-labor  ratio) to higher  productivity.  Hall and 
Jones attribute only  the  direct effect to TFP, ignoring  the indirect effect on the capital- 
labor ratio.  Second,  we  estimate  country  differences  in  the  quality  of  schooling  that 
reinforce differences  in the quantity  of schooling  attainment  across countries.  Hall and 
Jones look only at the quantity of schooling. 
5. Bosworth,  Collins,  and Chen  (1995) also estimate TFP growth rates with human  capital 
stocks constructed  using  a methodology  that is at some points  close to ours. Instead of 
exploring  the importance  of differences  in TFP growth  rates in explaining  international 
growth  variation,  these  authors use  such estimates  of TFP growth  to run cross-country 
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2. Reexamining  MRW 
In this  section  we  first describe  and comment  on MRW's methodology 
for attributing  differences  in  output  to  differences  in  productivity  vs. 
differences  in  capital intensity.  We then  update  MRW's estimates  and 
make a series of modifications,  such as incorporating primary school data 
and a more labor-intensive  technology  for producing  human  capital. 
MRW specify  the production  technology 
Y =  C +  IK +  IH =  KaHI(AL)'- a-,  (1) 
where  Y is output,  K and H are stocks of physical and human capital, A 
is a productivity  index,  and L is the number of workers. H = hL, where h 
is human  capital per worker.  Implicit is an infinite-lived  representative 
agent  whose  time enters  production  through dual components,  human 
capital H and  raw  labor L.6 As  shown  in  (1), MRW specify  the  same 
technology  for producing  human  and physical  capital. Time subscripts 
are suppressed,  as are the standard accumulation equations for K and H. 
MRW assume  that both  stocks  depreciate  geometrically  at a rate of 3% 
per year. 
If one  adds  competitive  output  and input  markets and constant  rela- 
tive risk aversion  utility, then  it is well known  that higher A will induce 
proportionate  increases in K and H. Given this fact, rather than the usual 
accounting  exercise  that assigns  output  or its growth  rate to contribu- 
tions  from K, H, L, and A, we  think MRW rightly rearrange (1) to yield 
Y  /  K  a/(ia-)  H\/(1-a-) 
L =A  -  = AX,  (2) 
L  Y. 
where  X is a composite  of the  two  capital intensities.  We concur with 
MRW's adoption  of (2) for two reasons.  First, Y/L is the object of interest 
rather  than  Y, since  we  want  to  understand  why  output  per  worker 
varies across countries,  leaving  aside how  a country's  number of work- 
ers L is determined.7  The A-vs.-X  debate really has nothing  to do with 
the determination  of L. Second,  (2) gives  A "credit" for variations in K 
and  H  generated  by  differences  in  A.  The  contributions  of  K and  H 
6. Formally,  the efficiency units contributed  by a worker with human capital h are e = 
h(l -a)A(-a-)/(1-a),  and the production  function is Y = KEl-",  where  E = eL. 
7. Parente,  Rogerson,  and Wright  (1996)  argue  that hours  worked  in the  market  (as opposed 
to home production)  by the average worker varies a lot across countries, making the 
number of workers a poor measure of market  labor  input. If, as these authors argue, 
market  hours per worker are much higher in richer  countries, it should contribute  to 
higher  A in richer  countries. The Neoclassical  Revival in Growth  Economics  * 77 
variations that are not induced  by A are captured by variations in capital 
intensity X.  This  decomposition  was  also  adopted  by King and  Levine 
(1994), albeit for a setting  with  physical  capital but not human  capital. 
We offer two  caveats  to  the  decomposition  in  (2), both  related  to A 
being  endogenous,  say resulting  from technology  adoption  decisions.8 
First, one would  expect that many country policies  affect both A and X. 
Weak enforcement  of property rights in a country, for example,  is likely 
to  decrease  both  A  and  X.  We think  the  decomposition  in  (2) is  still 
useful,  however,  because  there are some  policies  that could  affect one 
factor much more than the other (e.g.,  education policies).  Thus, finding 
that high levels  of output per worker are explained mostly by high levels 
of H/Y would  suggest  that differences  in education  policies  are an im- 
portant  element  in  explaining  international  differences  in  output  per 
worker.  Similarly, finding  that differences  in  K/Y are important  in  ac- 
counting  for  the  international  variation  in  output  per  worker  would 
point  towards  capital taxation or policies  that affect the relative price of 
investment  goods. 
The second  related caveat concerning  the decomposition  in (2) is that, 
just  as  K and  H are affected  by A,  A itself  may be  affected  by  capital 
intensity  X.  If A is  determined  by  technology  adoption,  for instance, 
8. We do not list the embodiment  of technology  in physical  capital  as problematic  for the 
decomposition  in (2). Suppose that productivity  entirely  reflects  the quality  of physical 
capital,  and that all countries  invest in the highest quality  capital  goods available  in the 
world in the period  of investment.  Then differences  in country  productivity  levels could 
be due to differences  in the vintage or age of a country's  capital  stock, i.e. unmeasured 
differences  in the quality  of a country's  capital  stock.  In this situation,  one might  think  (2) 
would attribute  to productivity  differences  what in reality  should be attributed  to differ- 
ences in physical  capital  intensity,  say because  countries  with high investment  rates  and 
high capital  intensity  are  using younger  and therefore  better  equipment.  If so, our  results 
would understate  the role of capital  intensity in explaining  international  output differ- 
ences. This concern  turns out to be unfounded along a steady-state  growth  path. To  see 
why, suppose the true,  quality-adjusted  capital  stock  evolves  according  to AKt  = BtIt  -  8Kt, 
where A is the first-difference  operator  and B is an exogenous  capital-embodied  technol- 
ogy index which grows at the constant  rate  g and (recall)  is the same for all countries. 
Imagine also that the measured  capital stock evolves  according to AKMt  = It -  8KMt  so that it 
does not reflect  improvements  in quality  coming  from  embodied  technology.  In this case 
one can show that if Y = K"L1l-,  then along a steady-state  growth  path  with constant  IIY 
and KM/Y  one has Y/Lt =  (cBt)'(1-a)(KM/Y)a'/-a)  with c a constant which depends  on g, a, 
and 8, and with KM/Y  =  (IIY)/(g+n+8),  where n is the exogenous  growth rate of L. Thus, 
along a steady-state  growth  path, a country's  TFP  is independent  of its investment  rate  in 
physical  capital.  That  is, the investment  rate  does not affect  the TFP  residual,  which  in this 
case is equal to ln(Y/Lt) -  a/(1 -  a) In(K/Y),  which in turn is equal to [1/(1 -  a)] ln(cB,). 
The intuition  for  this result  is that  a higher  investment  rate  reduces  the average  age of the 
capital  only temporarily,  along the transition  path. When the new steady-state  path is 
reached  with higher capital  intensity,  the age distribution  of the capital  stock-which  is 
synonymous with the quality  distribution-is the same as the distribution  with a lower 
capital  intensity.  Thus  a country  with a permanently  higher  IIY  than  another  country  will 
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then it is likely that higher  schooling  (i.e.,  higher H/Y) leads to a higher 
level of A. Once we  obtain estimates  of A and X, below  we will actually 
use  the  decomposition  of equation  (2) to study  this issue  by looking  at 
the correlation between  A and the capital-intensity  variables K/Y and H/ 
Y. A hypothetical  example will illustrate the usefulness  of this approach. 
Imagine  that,  using  this  decomposition,  we  find  that almost  all of the 
international  variation in levels  of Y/L is accounted  for by international 
differences  in A. But imagine  that we also find a strong positive  correla- 
tion between  A and H/Y. This would  be consistent  with-but  not neces- 
sarily proof for-the  view  that human capital explains differences in Y/L, 
albeit indirectly through its effect on A (say through economywide  tech- 
nology  adoption  as in the model  of Ciccone,  1994). On the other hand, 
finding  no  correlation  between  A and  H/Y would  suggest  that differ- 
ences  in schooling  are not important  in explaining  international  output 
differences. 
With these  preliminaries  out of the way, we now  proceed  to updating 
and  modifying  MRW's  estimates.  For  Y/L MRW use  the  Summers- 
Heston  GDP per capita in 1985. For K/Y for each country they use 
K  IK/Y  K  IKY  ,  (3) 
Y  g+  +n 
where  IK/Y is the average  Summers-Heston  investment  rate in physical 
capital  over  1960-1985,  g  is  0.02  (an  estimate  of  the  world  average 
growth  rate of YIL), 8 is 0.03 (a rather low depreciation  rate, but none  of 
the results in their paper or ours are sensitive  to using 0.06 instead),  and 
n is the country's  average  rate of growth  of its working-age  population 
(15- to 64-year-olds) over 1960-1985  (UNESCO yearbook). Expression (3) 
is  derived  as  the  constant  (or steady-state)  K/Y implied  by  the  capital 
accumulation  equation  given a constant IIY  and constant growth rates of 
Y/L and L.9 For H/Y MRW use the average 1960-1985 investment  rate in 
human  capital divided  by the same sum: 
H  IHIY  (4)  _-  '"/Y  .  (4) 
Y  g+  + n 
9. In Section  3 below we relax  this assumption  that in 1985  KIY  is at its steady-state  value. 
We make varying assumptions about 1960 K/Y  levels for each country, then use the 
accumulation  equation  and data on IIY  and Y over 1960-1985  to calculate  the 1985  K/Y. 
We find that the results vary little depending on the assumed 1960  value of K/Y.  As for 
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MRW use  the average  1960-1985  ratio of secondary-school  students  to 
the working-age  population  (UNESCO yearbook)  as an estimate  of the 
average investment  rate in human  capital: 
IH  L  population 12-17 
=  (secondary  enrollment  rate)  population  15-64  Y  -  Lpopulation  15-64 
Ignoring nonsecondary  schooling  (which we will find matters), the ratio 
is LHIL,  the fraction of worker time spent  in the human-capital  sector.'0 
Since in (1) the production  technology  for human  capital is the same as 
that for other  goods,  equating  the  ratios of marginal products  of labor 
and physical  capital across sectors entails LH/L  = KH/K,  where  L = LH +  Ly 
and K = KH+ Ky.l 
With  their  1985 levels  of  Y/L, K/Y, and  H/Y for 98 countries,  MRW 
regress  ln(Y/L) on  ln(K/Y) and  ln(H/Y). They  obtain an R2 of 0.78,  and 
their estimated  coefficients  are consistent  with production  elasticities  of 
a  =  0.30 for physical  capital and /3 = 0.28 for human capital (their Table 
II, restricted regression).  The high R2  is the basis of Mankiw's  (1995, p. 
295) conclusion  that "Put simply, most international differences in living 
standards  can be explained  by differences  in accumulation  of both hu- 
man and physical  capital." 
Even assuming  H/Y is measured  properly, we  are deeply  uncomfort- 
able with  estimating  a and  83  from an OLS regression  of ln(Y/L) on ln(K/ 
Y) and  ln(H/Y).  Consistency  of  such  estimates  requires  that  ln(X)  be 
orthogonal  to ln(A). Yet countries with policies discouraging capital accu- 
mulation  may also tend  to have  policies  discouraging  activites  (such as 
technology  adoption)  which  contribute to higher A. In Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997), one  of us develops  a quality ladder model wherein  higher tariffs 
on imported capital goods  result in both lower X (by reducing the invest- 
ment rate) and lower A (by increasing the average distance between  the 
quality of goods  imported  and the highest  quality of goods  available in 
the world). 
Given the possibility  that true X and true A are correlated, our prefer- 
ence is to use independent  evidence  to determine  appropriate values  of 
a and /,  and then  use  them to construct X and A. This being  said,  a  = 
0.30 is actually  in the ballpark of estimates  obtained  using  national  in- 
come accounts  (see Gollin,  1996, for evidence  on 31 countries with care- 
10. The implicit infinite-lived  representative  agent  is simultaneously  teacher (H) and stu- 
dent (L)! 
11. HHH = LHL,  because  the representative  worker's human capital and labor components 
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ful treatment of proprietors' income).  But we have no cause for comfort 
with p = 0.28. Studies  such as Jorgenson (1995) and Young (1995) look at 
compensation  of workers  in different education  and experience  catego- 
ries,  thereby  bypassing  the need  to choose  a single  share going  to hu- 
man capital. In other words,  the share going to labor input is 1 -  a, and 
workers with more education  and experience receive larger subshares  of 
this 1 -  a. We will do something  similar in Section 3 below by looking at 
Mincerian  estimates  of wage  differences  across workers  with  different 
education  and experience  levels.  For the rest of this section we keep f  = 
0.28, but we discuss  at the end how  the results are affected by consider- 
ing higher values. 
We now  show  how  the MRW results are sensitive  to several modifica- 
tions  that we  deem  necessary.  We keep  a  =  0.30 and P  =  0.28 for com- 
parison purposes.  Given that our modified  estimates  of X and A will be 
correlated,  there will  not be a unique  decomposition  of the variance of 
ln(Y/L) into the variance of ln(X) and the variance of ln(A).12 We think an 
informative way of characterizing the data is to split the covariance term, 
giving  half  to  ln(X)  and  half  to  ln(A).  This means  we  decompose  the 
variance of ln(Y/L) as follows: 
var ln(Y/L)  cov(ln(Y/L),ln(Y/L))  cov(ln(Y/L),ln(X)) + cov(ln(Y/L),ln(A)) 
var ln(Y/L)  var ln(Y/L)  var ln(Y/L), 
or 
_cov(ln(Y/L),ln(X))  cov(ln(Y/L),ln(A)) 
1=  + 
var ln(Y/L)  var ln(Y/L) 
This decomposition  is equivalent  to looking at the coefficients from inde- 
pendently  regressing  ln(X)  and  ln(A),  respectively,  on  ln(Y/L). Since 
ln(X) + ln(A) = ln(Y/L) and OLS is a linear operator, the coefficients  sum 
to  one.  So  our  decomposition  amounts  to  asking,  "When  we  see  1% 
higher Y/L  in one country relative to the mean of 98 countries,  how much 
higher  is our conditional  expectation  of X and how  much  higher is our 
conditional  expectation  of A?" The first row of Table 1 gives  the answer 
for MRWO,  the original MRW measure.  Since the covariance term is zero 
by construction  for MRWO, the breakdown  is precisely  their 78% ln(X) 
and 22% ln(A). 
12. Since MRW construct  ln(X) by regressing  In(Y/L)  on ln(H/Y) and ln(K/Y) with ln(A) as 
the  residual,  their  ln(X)  and  ln(A)  are orthogonal  by  construction,  and  the  unique 
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Table 1  THE ROLES OF A AND  X IN 1985 PROSPERITYa 
cov[ln(Y/L), In (Z)]/var ln(Y/L) 
Sourcea  Z=  (  Z =  Z = X  Z=A 
MRWO  .29  .49  .78  .22 
MRW1  .27  .49  .76  .24 
MRW2  .31  .47  .78  .22 
MRW3  .29  .11  .40  .60 
MRW4  .29  .04  .33  .67 
aMRWO:  from MRW  (uses their data appendix).  MRW1:  MRW0 but with Ky/Y  instead  of K/Y.  MRW2: 
MRW1  but with L = worker  instead  of working-age  population,  14  countries  in/out.  MRW3:  MRW2  but 
with all enrollment  rather  than just secondary  enrollment.  MRW4:  MRW3  but with (K,  H, L)  shares  of 
(0.1, 0.4, 0.5), not (0.20, 0.28, 0.42), in H production. 
Our  first  modification  of  MRW's  methodology  is  to  recognize  that, 
contrary  to  (1),  national  income  accounting  measures  of  output  do  not 
include  the  value  of  student  time-an  important  component  of  human 
capital  investment.13  To see  how  important  this  might  be,  we  consider 
the  extreme  case  in  which  none  of  the  human  capital  investment  is 
measured  as  part  of  total  output.  To do  this  we  replace  K/Y and  H/Y  in 
equation  (2)  with  Ky/Y and  Hy/Y, since  only  Ky and  Hy are  used  in  the 
production  of  Y when  Y does  not  include  human  capital  investment.  It 
turns  out  that  the  MRW  measure  of IH/Y,  namely  LHIL,  is also  appropriate 
for Hy/Y when  all human  capital  investment  goes  unmeasured.  The same 
is  not  true  for  physical  capital  intensity,  for  which  we  must  use  Ky/Y = 
(KIY)(Ly/L). As  shown  by  the  MRW1  row  of  Table  1,  this  modification 
results  in  a 76% ln(X)  vs.  24% ln(A)  breakdown,  so  this  distinction  does 
not  appear  to be  quantitatively  important. 
The  MRW2  row  of  Table  1 reproduces  the  MRW1  row,  only  with  up- 
dated  data  and  a  set  of  countries  for  which  we  have  all  the  necessary 
schooling  attainment  data  for  the  remainder  of  this  paper.  Like  MRW, 
13. MRW  contend that this slippage  between model and data is not quantitatively  impor- 
tant. Parente  and Prescott  (1996)  disagree,  contending  that unmeasured  human  capital 
investment must be implausibly  large for the combined share of capital  to be about 
two-thirds. Parente, Rogerson, and Wright  (1996)  illustrate  that unmeasured  invest- 
ment would have to be 25-76%  of GDP.  We are in closer  agreement  with MRW,  since, 
according  to Kendrick  (1976),  about half of schooling  investment  consists of education 
expenditures  (teachers,  facilities)  which are  included  in measured  output. According  to 
the  1996 Digest of Education Statistics published  by the U.S.  Department  of Education 
(1996), education expenditures averaged 7% of GDP over 1960-1990. Back-of-the- 
envelope calculations  suggest unmeasured  investment  might therefore  be only 13%  of 
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we  have  a sample  of  98 countries.14  We use  the  latest  Summers-Heston 
data  (Mark  5.6)  and  use  output  per  worker,  whereas  MRW  used  output 
per  capita.  The  measure  we  use  for Hy/Y here  is the  same  as that  used  by 
MRW,  except  we  use  Barro  and  Lee's  (1993)  data  on  secondary  enroll- 
ment  rates  in  1960,  1965,  .  .  . ,  1985  and  United  Nations  (1994)  popula- 
tion  data  by  age  groups  to compute  the  value  of 
-=  secondary  enrollment  rate  population  15-19 
Y  population  15-64  J 
for  each  country's  investment  rate  in  human  capital  in  1960,  1965,  .  .. 
1985.  MRW  used  population  aged  12-17  in the  numerator  of the  fraction 
in brackets,  due  to data  availability.  As  shown  in the  MRW2  row  of Table 
1,  if we  see  1% higher  Y/L, we  expect  0.78%  higher  X and  0.22%  higher 
A.  Since  the  results  are  very  similar  to  MRW1,  we  can  now  incorporate 
data  on  primary  schooling  enrollment,  etc.,  for  our  sample  of  98  coun- 
tries  without  fear  that  the  change  in  sample  obscures  the  comparison. 
Using  data  from  Barro  and  Lee  (1993),  the  MRW3  row  of Table  1 uses 
Hy/Y calculated  with  all  three  enrollment  rates.  The  results  are  striking. 
Conditional  on  1% higher  Y/L in  a country,  we  now  expect  only  0.40% 
higher  X  and  fully  0.60%  higher  A.  As  suggested  by  these  results,  pri- 
mary  enrollment  rates  do  not  vary  as  much  across  countries  as  secon- 
dary  enrollment  rates  do.  The  MRW3  measure  of ln(Hy/Y)  has  only  about 
one-fourth  the  variance  of  the  MRW0  measure  of  ln(Hy/Y).15 Moreover, 
the  correlation  of the  MRW3  measure  of ln(Hy/Y)  with  ln(Y/L) is only  .52, 
as opposed  to  .84 for the  MRW0  measure.  This  is not to say  that  primary- 
schooling  investments  are  unproductive  compared  to  other  schooling 
investments,  for  our  methodology  assumes  that  they  are productive.16  It 
14. In our sample but not in MRW's:  Gambia,  Guinea-Bissau,  Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Barba- 
dos, Guyana,  Iran,  Iraq,  Taiwan,  Cyprus,  Iceland,  Malta,  Yugoslavia,  and Fiji.  In  MRW's 
sample but not in ours: Angola, Burkina  Faso, Burundi,  Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia,  Ivory 
Coast, Madagascar,  Mauritania,  Morocco,  Nigeria, Sierra  Leone, Somalia,  and Sudan. 
15. One might think that adding primary  schooling enrollment  rates to secondary  enroll- 
ment rates will not lower the variance, since adding a constant does not affect the 
variance of a random variable. But since we are looking at the percentage  variance, 
adding the relatively  stable  primary  school enrollment  indeed lowers the variance. 
16. In the next section we discuss Mincer regression evidence consistent with primary 
schooling  indeed being productive.  Specifically,  each additional  year  of primary  school- 
ing in poor countries  is associated  with roughly 10%  higher  wages, suggesting impor- 
tant human capital investment is going on in primary  schools that should not be 
ignored. There remains  the issue of whether a year of enrollment  in secondary  school 
involves more investment in human capital  than a year in primary  school, so that the 
two enrollment rates should not simply be added together as we have done in the 
current section. The Mincer evidence that each additional year of schooling raises 
wages about 10%  suggests that more  absolute  investment  in human capital  is occurring 
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says,  rather,  that  primary  schooling  does  not  vary  anywhere  near  as 
much  with  Y/L across countries  as secondary  schooling  does.  By focus- 
ing only on secondary  schooling,  one overstates the percentage variation 
in  human  capital  across  countries  and  its  covariance  with  output  per 
worker. 
A further objection we have to the MRW measure of the human capital 
stock is that, as shown  in (1), its construction  assumes  the same technol- 
ogy  for  producing  human  capital  as  for producing  consumption  and 
physical  capital.  Kendrick (1976) presents  evidence  that the technology 
for producing  human  capital is more intensive  in labor than is the tech- 
nology  for producing  other goods.  He estimates that about 50% of invest- 
ment  in human  capital in the-United  States represents  the opportunity 
cost of student  time. The remaining 50% is composed  of expenditures  on 
teachers  (human  capital) and  facilities  (physical  capital).  According  to 
the 1996 Digest of Education  Statistics, expenditures  on teachers represent 
about  80% of  all expenditures.  These  figures  suggest  factor shares  of 
10%, 40%, and 50% for physical capital, human capital, and raw labor in 
the production  of human  capital, as opposed  to the 30%, 28%, and 42% 
shares  MRW use  for the  production  of  consumption  goods  and  new 
physical  capital. If we  let 
IH =  K  --H  (ALH) ,  (5) 
this evidence  suggests  4) =  0.4 and A =  0.5. Combining  (2), (4), and (5) 
yields17 
Hy  (  L/  L  \1/[1-K+A,I/(1-a-f3)]  /K)[1-4-  (1-fP)/(1-a-3)]/[1-  +A3/(1-a-)()] 
Y~L^-JI~~~~~  U~  ~(6)  Y  n+g+8  Y 
When the two sectors have the same factor intensity  (4)  =  3 and A =  1 - 
a -  3), this reduces  to Hy/Y = (LH/L)(n+g+8),  which MRW used and we 
used  above.  But with  ) = 0.40 and A = 0.50 the powers  in (6) are 1.07 on 
the first fraction and  -0.28  on the second.  Because human  capital pro- 
duction  is  more  human  capital-intensive  than  is  the  production  of  Y 
(0)>,3), a large share of labor devoted  to human capital accumulation has 
a more  than proportionate  effect on Hy/Y. And  because  human  capital 
production  is less  physical  capital-intensive  than is the production  of Y 
(1 -  4 -  A<a),  a high rate of investment  in physical capital raises Y more 
17. Hy/Y =  (Ly/L)  (HIY) =  (Ly/L)  (IHIY)/(n+g+8) =  [(Ly/L)/(n+g+8) (KH/Y)1'--A(HH/Y)t(ALH/ 
Y).  The expression  in the text can be obtained by substituting for A using (2) with Hy/Y 
and  Ky/Y and  by  using  KHIY  =  (LH/Ly)  (Ky/Y) and  HH/Y =  (LH/Ly)  (Hy/Y) (ignoring 
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than H, thereby reducing  Hy/Y. As shown  in the MRW4 row of Table 1, 
using  ) =  0.40 and A = 0.50 results in a split of 33% ln(X) vs. 67% ln(A). 
Comparing  MRW4 with  MRW3, we  see that lowering  the capital inten- 
sity of human  capital production  modestly  lowers  the variation of Hy/Y 
across countries. 
As  shown  by comparing  MRW0 with  MRW4 in Table 1, the cumula- 
tive effect of these modifications  is to remove the linchpin of the neoclas- 
sical revival: MRW's original (78%, 22%) decomposition  has given  way 
to a (33%, 67%) decomposition.  Can one  restore MRW's results  with  a 
higher  3?  Doubling  3 from 0.28 to 0.56 yields  a (51%, 49%) division.  As 
,3 rises  toward 23,  the  decomposition  approaches  60% vs.  40%. Thus a 
sufficiently  high  3 does  generate  results  that, although  not as dramatic 
as  those  of  MRW,  still  have  the  major  part  of  international  income 
variation explained  by differences  in levels  of physical and human  capi- 
tal per  worker.  But  what  is  the  right  value  for  3? Unfortunately,  we 
know  of  no  independent  estimates  of  "the" share  of  human  capital. 
Fortunately, in the next section  we  are able to exploit wage  regressions 
to measure  human-capital  stocks in a way  that does  not depend  on the 
value of  3. This regression  evidence  also appropriately weights  primary 
schooling  attainment  relative to secondary  schooling  attainment,  rather 
than lumping  them  together  with  equal weight  as we  have done  in the 
preceding. 
3.  Using  Mincer  Regression  Evidence  to Estimate  Human 
Capital  Stocks 
In this section  we  exploit evidence  from the labor literature on the wage 
gains associated  with more schooling  and experience.  For a cross section 
of  workers,  Mincer  (1974)  ran  a  regression  of  worker  log  wages  on 
worker  years  of  schooling  and  experience.  He  chose  this  specification 
because  it fit the data much  better than,  say, a regression  of the level of 
wages  on  the  years  of  schooling  and  experience.  To incorporate  this 
evidence  into the technology  for producing  human  capital, we abandon 
the infinite-life construct in favor of a life cycle in which people  first go to 
school  full time and then work full time. We specify  the following  tech- 
nology  for human  capital: 
h  =  (KH/LH)1 
- 
A(hT)(AeY/A)s)A,  (7) 
where  hs is the human  capital of somebody  with s years of schooling,  KH 
is  the  capital  stock  used  in  the  education  sector,  LH is  the  number  of The  Neoclassical  Revival  in Growth  Economics  ?  85 
students,  and hT is the human  capital of each teacher. Manipulating  (7) 
leads to18 
Hy  (/  \/[1-,+  A,3/(l-a-3)]  (Ky)[l-,-A(l-3)/(1-a-3a)]/[-1  + A3/(1-a-f3)] 
--^'M~~~~~  (7)  <(8) 
Bils and  Klenow  (1996) look  at Mincer regression  studies  covering  48 
countries and find that the wage  gain associated  with an additional year 
of education  averages  9.5% across the 48 countries and ranges from 5% 
to 15% for 36 of the 48 countries.  Based on technologies  (1) and (7), the 
percentage  wage  gain  to a representative  agent  from one  more year of 
schooling  is /8y/(1-a).  Therefore,  to match  an estimated  wage  gain  of 
9.5% we  set y = 0.095(1-a)/,3. 
Table 2 presents  results based on (7). The rows are labeled BKn  because 
(7) is from Bils and Klenow (1996). As with MRW4 above, we use a = 0.30, 
f3 = 0.28, 4 = 0.4, and A = 0.5. For years of schooling s, row BK1 uses the 
level implied  by the enrollment  rates used  in MRW3 and MRW4: s =  8 ? 
primary + 4 *  secondary  + 4 *  tertiary. As the BK1  row shows,  conditional 
on  1% higher  Y/L we  expect  0.60% higher  X and  0.40% higher  A.  So 
switching  from (6) used for MRW4 to (8) used for BK1 dramatically shifts 
the breakdown  from (33%, 67%) to (60%, 40%). The exponential  form of 
(7) implies that the higher the level of schooling,  the bigger is the absolute 
amount  of human  capital obtained  from the next year of schooling.  The 
exponential  form therefore puts more weight  on secondary school enroll- 
ment than on primary school enrollment,  moving us back toward MRW's 
78%-vs.-22% breakdown. 
One  concern  we  have  about  BK1, as  well  as  all  of  Table 1,  is  the 
assumption  that in 1985 K/Y and H/Y are at steady-state  levels.  The data 
show  lots of movement  in country growth  rates of Y, L, and YIL  and in 
country investment  rates in physical and human capital, suggesting  that 
country K/Y and H/Y levels  change  over time. To estimate an off-steady- 
state 1985 K/Y,  we use  the accumulation  equation and data on IIY  and Y 
18. In steady  state  h, =  hT =  h, so  that the  human  capital of each  student  entering  the 
workforce is the same as that of each teacher or worker. Using  this fact, h = HHILH,  so 
that H  =  hL =  L(KH/ILH)1-~-A(HH/LH)  (Ae(/)s)^, where  HH  is the total human  capital of 
teachers.  Expression  (8) can then be obtained much as expression  (6) was above. There 
are  two  (offsetting?)  shortcomings  in  our  treatment:  First,  we  are  assuming  the 
student-teacher  ratio is the  same in each country  (we fix it at one,  but the level  does 
not  affect  cross-country  variance  analysis).  This  ratio is  presumably  lower  in  richer 
countries.  Second,  our  setup  assumes  that teacher  education  varies  as much  across 
countries  as average  worker education  does  (hT =  h). In reality teacher schooling  may 
vary less  than average  worker schooling,  say if in every country high-school  teachers 
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Table  2  THE  ROLES  OF A AND X IN 1985  PROSPERITY 
cov[ln(Y/L),  In (Z)]/var  ln(Y/L) 
Sourcea  K 
Z=  (  Z = X  Z =A 
BK1  .29  .31  .60  .40 
BK2  .23  .33  .56  .44 
BK3  .23  .31  .53  .47 
BK4  .23  .11  .34  .66 
"BK1:  uses (7), i.e. Mincer  evidence. BK2:  calculates  years of schooling  s from  Barro-Lee  1985  stocks 
instead  of 1960-1985  flows. BK3:  adds average  years  of experience.  BK4:  BK3  but with (K,  H, L)  shares  of 
(0, 0, 1) instead  of (0.1, 0.4, 0.5) in H production. 
over  1960-1985.  Unfortunately,  direct estimates  of the 1960 K/Y are not 
available for most countries.  We therefore set, for each country, 
/K  IK_  IK/Y 
J  196=g+8+n 
with the investment  rate IK/Y,  the growth rate of YIL  (g), and the popula- 
tion growth rate (n) equal to the country's averages over either 1960-1965, 
1960-1970,  or 1960-1985,  and 8 either 0.03, 0.05, or 0.07. We also followed 
a procedure akin to King and Levine (1994) where we set g in the denomi- 
nator equal to a weighted  average of own-country  and world growth. The 
results were not at all sensitive  to which  way we calculated the 1960 K/Y, 
so we report the results with 1960 K/Y  calculated using 8 = 0.03 (as in Table 
1) and the country's  own  averages  over  1960-1970  for g and n. To con- 
struct the 1985 H/Y, we use Barro  and Lee's (1993) data on average years of 
schooling  attained  by the 25-64-year-old  population  in each country in 
1985. We report the results of using this approach to obtain 1985 levels of 
K/Y and H/Y in the BK2 row of Table 2. Conditional  on 1% higher Y/L  in 
one country in 1985, we expect 0.56% higher X and 0.44% higher A in that 
country. These results are not far from the (60%, 40%) breakdown in BK1 
with the steady-state  assumption  for K/Y and H/Y.19 
We now  modify  (7) to  incorporate  human  capital acquired  through 
experience: 
hs =  (KH/LH) --  A(hT)4(Ae(ls+  Y2exp+  y3exp2)/)  (9) 
19. The  close  similarity  between  H/Y calculated  in BK1 and  in BK2, i.e.  between  school 
attainment  implied  by enrollments  and measures  of years of schooling  attained,  sug- 
gests  that differences  in the duration of primary, secondary, and higher education  from 
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where  exp = (age -  s -  6). The average experience level among workers 
was  estimated  using  United  Nations  (1994) data  in  combination  with 
Barro and Lee's schooling  attainment  data. For each country experience 
was  calculated  as the  population-weighted  average  of (age  -  s  -  6) at 
ages  27,  32,  .  .  .,  62  for  the  groups  25-29,  30-34,  .  ...  ,  60-64  in  1985. 
Surprisingly, we find that the correlation between  average years of expe- 
rience of 25-64-year-olds  and ln(Y/L) in 1985 is  -0.67.  Richer countries 
have  older workforces,  but slightly  less  experienced  ones  because  they 
spend  more  years  in  school.  As  above,  y,  =  0.095(1-a)//3.  Bils  and 
Klenow  (1996) report  average  estimated  coefficients  on  exp  and  exp2 
across 48 countries  of 0.0495 and  -0.0007.  Based on these,  we  set  72  = 
0.0495(1 -a)//3  and y3 = 0.0007(1 -a)c//.  The consequence  of adding expe- 
rience can be seen  in the BK3 row of Table 2. As compared to the (56%, 
44%) split in BK2, the split in BK3 is (53%, 47%). 
Underlying  this breakdown  of 53% ln(X) vs. 47% ln(A) is the supposi- 
tion that the quality of schooling  is much  higher in richer countries.  In 
richer countries,  students  enjoy better facilities (higher KH/LH)  and better 
teachers (higher HHILH). From (9), the quality of schooling  is 
quality of schooling  =  (KH/L-H)1  -h  OAI  . 
Using  this  formula,  for BK3 the  elasticity  of quality  with  respect  to  a 
country's  Y/L is 0.95%.20  This means  a country with  1% higher  Y/L has 
0.95% higher  quality  education.  Note  that  higher  quality  of  this  type 
does not raise the percentage wage premium from education,  but instead 
raises  the  base  (log)  wage  for  anyone  in  the  country  receiving  some 
education.  It should  affect the  intercept  of the Mincer regression  for a 
country, but not the coefficient on schooling. 
Is an educational  quality elasticity of 0.95% reasonable? Is it plausible 
that, like GDP per worker, the quality of education  varies by a factor of 
about 34 across countries  in 1985? An independent  estimate of the qual- 
ity elasticity can be gleaned  from the wages  of U.S. immigrants.21 Using 
1970 and  1980 census  data on the U.S.  earnings  of immigrants  from 41 
countries,  Borjas (1987) estimates  country-of-origin-specific  intercepts in 
a Mincer regression  of log wages  on immigrant years of education  and 
experience.  He finds  that immigrants with  1% higher per capita income 
in their country  of origin exhibit a 0.116% higher  wage  intercept  (stan- 
20. Calculated  as cov[ln(quality),  ln(Y/L)]/var  ln(Y/L). 
21. Incidentally,  the enormous pressure for migration  from poor to rich countries  is itself 
consistent with substantial  differences  in productivity  across  countries.  However, this 
pressure could be entirely explained by higher physical capital-output ratios and 
greater  nonpecuniary  benefits of living in richer  countries. 88 *  KLENOW  & RODRiGUEZ-CLARE 
dard error 0.025). This implies a quality elasticity of only 0.12%, suggest- 
ing that the elasticity embedded  in BK3 is very aggressive.22'23 
Borjas's evidence  suggests  an alternative,  namely  that teachers  and 
class  facilities  affect school  quality  through  the  schooling  coefficient  y. 
In this  event  we  would  expect  to  see  higher  Mincer  schooling  coeffi- 
cients in richer countries.  Bils and Klenow  (1996) find the opposite:  each 
additional  year  of  schooling  brings  roughly  10% higher  wages  in  a 
country  where  the average  worker has 5 years of schooling,  compared 
to only  about 5% higher  wages  in a country where  the average worker 
has 10 years of schooling.  Perhaps  's are higher in richer countries,  but 
the  effect  on  the  education  premium  is  more  than  offset  by  a  lower 
relative  marginal  product  of  human  capital  in  richer  countries.  This 
could  arise because  of imperfect  substitutability  of workers with  differ- 
ent  education  levels  combined  with  abundance  of  human  capital  in 
richer countries.  Indeed,  the  Cobb-Douglas  technology  in  (1) implies 
unit elasticity  of substitution  between  human  capital and raw labor and 
therefore  a falling  education  premium  with  a country's  H/Y, holding  y 
constant. 
It is interesting  to explore  the possibility  that the Mincer coefficients 
already capture the effect of education  quality combined  with imperfect 
substitutability. This would  correspond  to the extreme case when  teach- 
ers and  class buildings  affect only  the  /s,  so that 4 =  0 and A =  1. It 
would  be  ideal  to  do  this  exercise  using  Mincer  coefficients  for each 
country, but unfortunately  we  do  not have  such  data for all countries. 
Here we  use the average Mincer coefficient of 9.5% instead.  (The reader 
should  note  that,  since  the Mincer coefficient  is actually declining  with 
income  per worker,  this biases  the results against a large role for A.) As 
we  report  in  the  BK4 row  of  Table 2,  without  Mincer-intercept-type 
variations  in school  quality, human  capital contributes much less  to Y/L 
variation.  The  (ln(X),  ln(A)) division  shifts  from (53%, 47%) in BK3 to 
(34%, 66%) in BK4. 
How  do  we  choose  between  BK3 and  BK4? Recall that  the  school 
22. Immigrants  may be more able than the average person in their country of origin. 
Borjas's  regression controls for observable  differences  in immigrants'  ability such as 
age, years of schooling, and English proficiency.  With regard  to unobservables,  the 
estimate of education  quality  differences  would be biased downward  if positive selec- 
tion (in Borjas's  terminology)  were greater  the poorer  the country  of origin. As Borjas 
notes, the opposite may be true, since income inequality  tends to be greater  in poorer 
countries. 
23. Further  cause for concern is the difficulty  researchers  such as Hanushek (1986)  and 
Heckman, Layne-Farrar,  and Todd (1996)  have encountered  in correlating  schooling 
outcomes with teacher  inputs. A (virtually  controlled)  experiment  in Tennessee,  how- 
ever, found that the group of students placed  in smaller  K-3 classes performed  signifi- 
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quality elasticity implied by BK3 is 0.95%, whereas  BK4 implies no varia- 
tion  in  school  quality  (of the  intercept  type)  across countries.  The evi- 
dence  from Borjas (1987) suggests  that BK3's elasticity  is much  higher 
than the truth; the zero elasticity in BK4 seems  closer. But if BK3 comes 
from data  on  the  shares  of capital and  teachers  in  the  U.S.  education 
sector, why  might it deliver wrong  results? There are three possibilities. 
First is the reason we just gave,  namely  that these  inputs  affect the  /s. 
Second,  it could be that human capital varies much less across education 
sectors than across other sectors; i.e.,  international differences in human 
capital  may  be  smaller  for teachers  than  for other  workers.  Finally, it 
could be that productivity  A is not as significant in the education  sector 
as it is in other sectors.  In the extreme case when  A does  not enter the 
education  sector at all, we find that the parameter values 4 = 0.19 and A 
=  0.81 generate  a quality  elasticity  matching  Borjas's 0.12.  In this case 
we  find a (42%, 58%) breakdown,  in between  BK3 and BK4 but a little 
closer to the latter. 
We conclude  that richer countries tend to have higher K/Y,  higher H/Y, 
and  higher  A,  with  a dominant  role for A,  a large role for K/Y, and  a 
modest-to-large  role for H/Y. To us this says that theorizing about interna- 
tional output differences  should  center at least as much on differences in 
productivity  as  on  differences  in  physical  or human  capital intensity. 
Figures  1 and 2 display  ln(A) and ln(X) using  MRWO  and BK4, respec- 
tively.24 In the MRWO  world,  research should  focus  on explaining  why 
ln(X) varies so much; in the BK4 world a greater priority is to understand 
differences  in ln(A). 
In contrasting  MRWO  and BK4, it is instructive  to look at the correla- 
tions  among  output  per worker  (Y/L), capital intensity  (K/Y and H/Y), 
and productivity  (A). Table 3a shows  the correlation matrix for the case 
where  HIY is measured  according to MRWO;  Table 3b does  the same for 
the case where H/Y is measured  according to BK4. In both cases YIL,  K/Y, 
and H/Y are highly  positively  correlated with each other. The difference 
arises  in  the  correlation  between  these  variables  and  A.  In particular, 
Table 3a shows  no correlation between  A and K/Y or between  A and H/Y 
(both  by  MRW construction),  whereas  the  corresponding  correlations 
are quite positive  in Table 3b. In thinking about a theory of endogenous 
A, it is hard to imagine  that policies  discouraging  K/Y and H/Y-such  as 
high  tax rates-would  not  also  discourge  A. The positive  BK4 correla- 
tions seem  much easier to generate  theoretically. 
A possible  reason for the 0.57 correlation between  ln(A) and ln(H/Y) is 
24. These  figures display  visually  what we  try to convey  by splitting the covariance terms 
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Figure  1 1985  LEVELS:  MRWO 
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that high  H/Y, say due  to generous  education  subsidies,  facilitates tech- 
nology  adoption.  Ciccone  (1994) presents  a model with  this feature: the 
larger the economy's  stock of human capital, the more profitable it is for 
a  firm  to  spend  the  fixed  costs  of  adopting  a given  technology,  and 
therefore the higher the economy's  A relative to the world frontier. Note 
that this story links an economy's  A to an economy's  HIY,  not an individ- 
ual worker's  A to an individual  worker's  h. We stress  that the  Mincer 
evidence  deployed  in this section  should  capture any link between  the 
schooling  of an individual  worker and the level of technology  (e.g. equip- 
ment  quality) that worker can use.  This is because  technology  adoption 
that is linked to the individual  should  show  up in the private wage  gain 
to more education. 
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Table 3  CORRELATION MATRICES 
a.  With MRWO  methodology 
ln(Y/L)  ln(KY)  ln(H/Y) 
ln(K/Y)  .77 
ln(H/Y)  .84  .67 
ln(A)  .47  .00  .00 
b.  With BK4 Methodology 
ln(Y/L)  ln(K/Y)  ln(H/Y) 
ln(K/Y)  .59 
ln(H/Y)  .60  .02 
ln(A)  .93  .28  .57 
-2.0  -1.5 
I 
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At this point several robustness  checks are in order. We first look at the 
potential  importance of imperfect substitutability. For 45 countries in Bils 
and Klenow's  (1996) sample,  Barro and Lee (1996) report percentages  of 
the  25-64-year-old  population  in seven  educational  attainment  catego- 
ries: none,  some primary, completed  primary only, some secondary, com- 
pleted  secondary  only,  some  tertiary, and  completed  tertiary. We treat 
"some" as half-completed,  and assume  the durations are 8, 4, and 4 years 
for primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling.  We assume  the first three 
categories are perfectly substitutable  "primary equivalents,"  and that the 
last four are perfectly  substitutable  "secondary equivalents": 
Y  = K(Hl-1/t  Hl-1/1o)(1-a)/(1-  lla)  pnm  sec  / 
with 
Hpnm=  E  ALseY,  Hs,  =  > 
ALAey, 
s=0,4,8  s=10,12,14,16 
where  Ls is  the  number  of  working-age  people  in  schooling  group  s. 
Note  that this specification  follows  BK4 in eschewing  Mincer-intercept- 
affecting  school  quality  differences.  We use  nonlinear  least  squares  to 
estimate  or and  y78/(1-a)  using  Barro and  Lee's  Ls data  and  Bils and 
Klenow's  data on the estimated  education premium for the 45 countries. 
The resulting  estimates  are y =  0.09(1-a)/f,  and ar =  65.25  We then use 
these  estimates  to construct  H aggregates  for the 84 of our 98 countries 
for which  Barro and Lee (1996) have the necessary  schooling  attainment 
data. The resulting  breakdown  is (40%, 60%), tilted a little toward ln(X) 
relative to the BK4 row, which  uses  y =  0.095(1-  a)/l  and ar  =  1 (albeit 
with  human  capital vs.  raw labor rather than  primary equivalents  vs. 
secondary  equivalents).  We conclude  from this exercise that allowing  for 
imperfect  substitutability  (and incorporating heterogeneity  in schooling 
attainment  within  each country) does  not significantly affect the results. 
Our  next  robustness  check  concerns  the  size  of  f.  In the  previous 
section we found that raising the value of this parameter boosted  the role 
of human  capital in explaining  international income variation. This does 
not happen  here.  Here we choose  the coefficients  y in (7) and (9) so that 
the  implied  wage  gain  for each  additional  year of education,  which  is 
25. This degree  of substitutability  is very high compared to the 1.5 estimated  by Katz and 
Murphy  (1992) for high-school  vs.  college  equivalents  in the  United  States.  We have 
imposed  a common  y, however,  so our high estimated  substitutability  may be captur- 
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given  by /3y/(l-a),  matches  the Mincer evidence  discussed  in Bils and 
Klenow  (1996). Thus changing  3 results in an offsetting  adjustment  in y 
to preserve  the  equality  3y/(l-a)  =  9.5%. In other words,  there is no 
doubling  of the importance  of human  capital from doubling  f  to 0.56, 
since the coefficient  y must be halved  at the same time. Indeed,  there is 
zero  effect.  The  intuition  is  that  the  Mincer  estimates  pin  down  the 
combined  effect of translating schooling  into human capital and translat- 
ing  human  capital into  output.  Thus  a larger elasticity  of output  with 
respect  to human  capital requires a smaller elasticity  of human  capital 
with  respect  to  schooling  in  order  to  maintain  consistency  with  the 
Mincer regression  evidence. 
An objection to the Mincer evidence  is that the coefficient on schooling 
captures  only  private gains  from schooling.  Productive benefits  of econ- 
omywide  human  capital, as proposed  by Lucas (1988), would be absorbed 
in the  Mincer intercept.  Lucas (1990) argues  that human  capital exter- 
nalities can explain the large differences in TFP that Krueger (1968) found 
across  28 countries  even  after adjusting  for human  capital per worker 
(measured  much  as  in  BK4). Leaving  aside  the  nature  of  these  exter- 
nalities,  it is  illuminating  to  ask  how  big  they  have  to be  in  order  to 
restore  MRW's 78%-vs.-22% breakdown.  For BK3, with  its  substantial 
variation in education  quality, we  find that the social Mincer coefficient 
on  schooling  would  have  to  be  15.6%, as  opposed  to  the  9.5% or so 
typically found.  For BK4, the social education premium would have to be 
29%. Since  the  evidence  on  school  quality  favors BK4, it appears  that 
external benefits  of schooling  would  need  to be larger than the private 
benefits!  In any case,  entertaining  externalities leads to questions  about 
their exact nature and transmission.  To us, this supports our call for more 
research into the source of productivity  differences  across countries. 
4.  From  Development  Accounting  to Growth  Accounting 
Whereas  Tables 1 and 2 were  concerned  with  development  accounting 
(King and  Levine's  felicitous  1994 phrase),  Table 4 is about growth  ac- 
counting.  For Table 4 we constructed K/Y  and H/Y for each country in 1960 
so that we  could  compute  1960-1985  growth  rates. We did this for BK2 
through  BK4 (one cannot do it under the steady-state  assumptions  used 
for MRWs and for BK1). For H/Y we used Barro  and Lee's (1993) schooling 
stocks  in  1960 and,  when  necessary  to construct experience  levels,  the 
United Nations  (1994) population  data for 1960. We estimated the 1960 Kl 
Y's as described in the previous  section,  and the results here are not at all 
sensitive  to the various ways  we tried to estimate  1960 K/Y's. 
Table 4 presents  the results of 1960-1985  growth  accounting.  When a 94 *  KLENOW  & RODRiGUEZ-CLARE 
Table  4  THE  ROLES  OF A AND X IN 1960-1985  GROWTH 
cov[A  ln(Y/L),  A In (Z)]/var  A ln(Y/L) 
Source  Z=  YZ  Z = X  Z = A 
BK2  .03  .12  .15  .85 
BK3  .03  .12  .14  .86 
BK4  .03  .06  .09  .91 
aBK2:  calculates  years of schooling  s from  Barro-Lee  1985  stocks  instead  of 1960-1985  flows. BK3:  adds 
average  years  of experience.  BK4:  BK3  but with (K, H, L) shares  of (0, 0, 1) instead  of (0.1, 0.4, 0.5) in H 
production. 
country's  1960-1985  growth  rate of output  per worker is 1% faster than 
average,  growth  in physical  capital intensity  typically contributes about 
0.03%. For BK2, which  includes  only  the schooling  contribution  to hu- 
man capital, H/Y growth  contributes  0.12% more,  the share owing  to A 
being  0.85%.  Adding  experience  (BK3) does  not  change  the  calculus. 
Letting  education  quality  enter  through  the  Mincer coefficients,  as  in 
BK4, boosts  the contribution  of A to 91%. 
The consistent  outcome  in Table 4 is that differences in growth rates of 
Y/L derive overwhelmingly  from differences  in growth rates of A.26  Fig- 
ure 3 plots  A growth  against  X growth  (based on BK4) to demonstrate 
this  visually.  The  small  role  we  find  for growth  in  the  human-capital 
stock is not new.  Benhabib and Spiegel  (1994) and Pritchett (1995) report 
that  the  growth  rate  of  schooling  attainment  is  virtually  uncorrelated 
with  growth  in  output  per  worker  across  countries  over  1960-1985. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin find the same thing (1995, Chapter 12), but mark 
it down  to measurement  error. 
Table 4 suggests  that Chapters 1 to 4 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
and studies  such as Chari, Kehoe,  and McGrattan (1996) that emphasize 
transition  dynamics  of the neoclassical  growth  model  ignore  the major 
source of differences  in country growth rates. Our results call for greater 
emphasis  on  models  of technology  diffusion  and  policies  that directly 
affect productivity.27 
26. For the 98-country sample,  the unweighted  average Y/L  growth across the 98 countries 
is 2.24%. Using  (2), this can be broken down  into 0.77% from KIY  growth,  0.44% from 
H/Y  growth, and 1.03%  from  A growth. This average-world-growth  accounting  is distinct 
from the country-variation-in-growth-rates  accounting  that we focus on above. Unlike  the 
country-variation-in-growth  rates, which are dominated by variation in the growth rate 
of A, the trend growth in Y/L  in the world (2.24%) owes  more to X growth (1.21%) than 
to A growth  (1.03%). 
27. Some of the examples  offered by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) as contributors to 
their effective  tax rate may affect productivity  A directly. Regulations  and corruption 
would  be expected  to hinder firms' ability to translate K and H into Y. The  Neoclassical  Revival  in Growth  Economics  *  95 
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The Appendix  contains  1985 levels and 1960-1985 growth rates of Y/L, 
KIY,  HIY, and A (the latter two  for BK4). For ease  of interpretation  the 
1985 level  variables are given  relative to the United States. Many coun- 
tries  surprisingly  come  out  higher  than  the  United  States  in  our  esti- 
mates  for A.  Perhaps  we  have  been  aggressive  in our estimates  of the 
return  to  human  capital  (e.g.  making  no  attempt  to  adjust  for ability 
bias), but we prefer to err on this side,  given our conclusion  that human 
capital's importance  has been  seriously  overstated  in previous  research. 
As we  mentioned  at the beginning  of Section 2, the fact that A is not 
exogenous  implies  that the  growth  rate of A could  be  affected  by  the 
growth  rate of  K/Y and  H/Y. Increasing  levels  of  capital intensity  and 
schooling  could  thus be responsible  for high growth  rates indirectly, by 
allowing  for a faster  growth  of A.  To examine  this  possibility  Table 5 
shows  the correlation matrix for the 1960-1985 growth rates of Y/L, K/Y, 
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Table  5  CORRELATION  MATRIX  (BK4  GROWTH  RATES) 
A ln(Y/L)  A ln(K/Y)  A ln(H/Y) 
A ln(K/Y)  .04 
A ln(H/Y)  .28  -.50 
Aln(A)  .87  -.42  .34 
H/Y, and A according  to BK4. The 0.34 correlation between  the growth 
rates of A and H/Y suggests  that countries  with  high  growth  in A have 
had unusually  high growth rates of schooling.  Thus it could be that high 
growth in economywide  schooling  attainment powerfully  boosts growth 
through its effect on technology  adoption.  In contrast, the negative corre- 
lations between  the growth  rate of KIY  and the growth  rates of, respec- 
tively, H/Y and A are puzzling.28 
An alternative way  to think about the role of factor accumulation  and 
total productivity  factor (TFP) growth  in explaining  differences  in eco- 
nomic  performance  across countries  is to look at what has happened  to 
the  standard  deviations  of  Y/L, KIY, H/Y, X,  and  A  (as  logarithms) 
across time.  Table 6 compares  the standard deviations  of these  variables 
in  1960  and  1985.  As  is  well  known,  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
logarithm  of output  per worker increased  somewhat  during this period 
(i.e.,  o-divergence).  We find  that o-convergence  occurred for K/Y, but 
not for H/Y, X,  and A.  Thus  the lack of a-convergence  in Y/L does  not 
stem from, say, A-convergence  combined  with X-divergence.29 
5.  Do Young's  Findings Contradict  Ours? 
The  debate  over  whether  fast rates of growth  in  some  countries  stem 
from accumulation  of capital or from technology  catch-up has been heav- 
ily influenced  by  the  East Asian  miracles.  It was  initially  thought  that 
these  countries  had very high TFP growth  rates, pointing  to technology 
catch-up as the heart of the story. Then came the careful work of Alwyn 
Young showing  that these countries grew mostly through input accumu- 
lation (Young, 1995), and that their TFP growth rates were not extraordi- 
narily high  (Young,  1994). Singapore,  for instance,  was  shown  to have 
28. The  negative  correlation  between  the  growth  rates  of A and  K/Y could  indicate  an 
overstatement  of the contribution  of K/Y to outut per worker. One reason for this may 
be  that  public  investment  (which  is part of the  data on  investment  that we  used  to 
generate  K/Y) is less  efficient  than private investment  in generating  efficiency  units of 
capital. If this is true, then the role of A is even  larger than shown  in our results. 
29. We also did our variance decomposition  on the 1960 numbers and obtained exactly the 
same  breakdown  (34% ln(X) vs.  66% ln(A)) for BK4 that we  did  for 1985 in Table 2. The  Neoclassical  Revival  in Growth  Economics  *  97 
Table  6  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  (BK4  LEVELS) 
Quantity  1960  1985 
ln(Y/L)  0.95  1.01 
ln(K/Y)  0.73  0.55 
ln(H/Y)  0.28  0.28 
ln(X)  0.46  0.44 
ln(A)  0.71  0.72 
virtually no productivity  growth over the last decades.  As a result of this 
work,  many  people  have  concluded  that the East Asian  episodes  illus- 
trate the importance of neoclassical transition dynamics rather than tech- 
nology  catch-up. 
We do not think this interpretation of Young's results is correct. First, as 
we argued above,  we think the debate is over whether  capital accumula- 
tion  or technology  catch-up  explains  growth  in  output  per worker,  not 
growth in output.  Neither  hypothesis  tries to explain the growth rate of 
employment.  Second,  as we also argued above, growth in physical capi- 
tal induced  by  rising  productivity  should  be attributed to productivity 
[Barro and  Sala-i-Martin also make  this point  (1995, p.  352)]. A higher 
level of productivity raises the marginal point of capital, thereby stimulat- 
ing investment  and capital accumulation  that would  not have  occurred 
without  the higher level of productivity. The role of capital accumulation 
over and above that stimulated by productivity growth can be measured 
by  the  growth  rate of  the  capital-output  ratio. Table 7a reports  a few 
calculations from Young's (1995) tables to illustrate the quantitative impor- 
tance of these considerations.  The annual growth rates of output and TFP, 
respectively, were 7.3% and 2.3% in Hong Kong, 8.7% and 0.2% in Singa- 
pore,  10.3% and 1.7% in South Korea, and 9.4% and 2.6% in Taiwan. So 
growth  in output  clearly came primarily from input  accumulation.  But 
the growth  rates of output per worker  and adjusted  TFP-TFP  raised to 1/ 
(1 -  capital's share) because  of its effect on capital accumulation-were 
as follows:  4.7% and 3.7% in Hong  Kong, 4.2% and 0.3% in Singapore, 
4.9% and 2.5% in South Korea, and 4.8% and 3.5% in Taiwan. So in three 
of the four East Asian miracles growth in output per worker came mostly 
from productivity  gains. 
In any case,  the debate should  not focus entirely on the miracle coun- 
tries of East Asia.  Although  our data is much less detailed than the data 
Young compiled  for each  of the  four Asian  tigers,  our hope  is that by 
covering 98 countries we get a sense  of whether Young's results are typi- 
cal of the sources  of growth  differences  in the world as a whole.  We are 
particularly interested,  therefore,  in whether  our results  for the Asian 98 *  KLENOW  & RODRiGUEZ-CLARE 
Table  7 
a. Alwyn  Young's  results 
Country  Y Growth  TFP  Growth 
Hong Kong  7.3  2.3 
Korea  10.3  1.7 
Singapore  8.7  0.2 
Taiwan  9.4  2.6 
Country  Y/L  Growth  A Growth 
Hong Kong  4.7  3.7 
Korea  4.9  2.5 
Singapore  4.2  0.3 
Taiwan  4.8  3.5 
b. Young's  A growth  vs. ours 
A growth 
Country  Young's  Ours  Why  different? 
Hong Kong  3.7  4.4  L data 
Korea  2.5  2.5  O.K. 
Singapore  0.3  3.3  L data; K share 
Taiwan  3.5  3.0  O.K. 
tigers are not too far off from Young's numbers.  Table 7b reports our BK4 
1960-1985  A growth  rates  for the  Asian  tigers  alongside  Young's  esti- 
mates.  Our estimate  for South  Korea matches  Young's (2.5%), and our 
estimate  for Taiwan actually falls below  Young's (3.0% vs. his 3.5%). For 
Hong  Kong  our estimate  is higher  (4.4% vs.  3.7%), and for Singapore 
our estimate  is much higher (3.3% vs. 0.3%). Young uses census  data for 
L rather than  Summers-Heston  data,  and the  census  data show  faster 
growth  of L for Hong  Kong and Singapore.30 Faster growth  of L trans- 
lates  into  slower  growth  of  Y/L and  A  (with  growth  in  H/Y and  K/Y 
unaffected).  This explains the entire difference in our estimates for Hong 
Kong.  For Singapore  Young  used  a physical-capital  share  of  0.49,  as 
opposed  to the 0.30 we used.  Combined with the difference in L growth, 
Young's higher  capital share explains  almost all of the gap in our Singa- 
pore estimates,  since K/Y grew sharply there. 
We close  by  stressing  that  our results  share  two  important  features 
30. For 1966-1990,  Young's  worker/population  ratios  rose from  0.38 to 0.49 for Hong Kong 
and from 0.27 to 0.51 for Singapore.  The comparable  Summers-Heston figures were 
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with  those  of Young (1994, 1995). First, we  find a very modest  role for 
growth  in human  capital per worker in explaining  growth  (Young's ad- 
justments  for labor quality are a few  tenths  of a percent per year). Sec- 
ond,  we  find that TFP growth accounts for most of the growth of output 
per worker in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. And we stress that 
this relative importance  of TFP growth  for three of the four Asian tigers 
generalizes  to our sample  of 98 countries: we  find that roughly  90% of 
country  differences  in  YIL growth  are attributable to  differences  in A 
growth.  Combining  these  growth results with our findings  on levels,  we 
call  for  returning  productivity  differences  to  the  center  of  theorizing 
about international  differences  in output per worker. 
Appendix.  Data 
Y/L  = 1985  RGDPW  in Summers-Heston PWT  5.6. 
K/Y  = 1985  physical-capital-to-output  ratio  (see Section  4 for K/Y  used for BK2- 
BK4). 
H/Y = 1985  human-capital-to-output  ratio  (see Section  4 for H/Y  used for BK4). 
A = 1985  level of productivity  [see equation  (2)]. Note: Levels are relative  to the 
United States. 
g(Z) = 1960-1985  annual growth rate of series Z. 
g(Y/L)  g(K/Y)  g(H/Y)  g(A) 
Y/L  KIY  H/Y  A  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Algeria  0.40  0.79  0.33  0.99  2.89  0.71  0.64  1.96 
Benin  0.07  0.47  0.34  0.25  0.78  1.37  0.02  -0.21 
Botswana  0.20  0.49  0.47  0.55  6.85  2.20  0.71  4.81 
Cameroon  0.11  0.27  0.56  0.43  4.22  1.16  0.63  2.97 
Central  Afr.R.  0.04  0.60  0.30  0.12  0.33  -0.79  0.53  0.54 
Congo  0.20  0.29  0.48  0.81  4.06  -1.81  0.30  5.16 
Gambia  0.05  0.39  0.38  0.18  1.37  4.32  -0.70  -1.25 
Ghana  0.07  0.43  0.47  0.20  0.36  -0.60  1.51  -0.22 
Guinea-Biss  0.04  1.23  0.22  0.10  1.52  -0.01  0.34  1.29 
Kenya  0.06  0.63  0.40  0.15  1.31  -0.10  1.03  0.70 
Lesotho  0.06  0.41  0.51  0.18  5.03  4.28  -0.55  2.34 
Liberia  0.07  0.74  0.31  0.18  1.22  -0.82  0.92  1.19 
Malawi  0.03  0.57  0.39  0.10  1.70  1.87  0.04  0.34 
Mali  0.05  0.67  0.27  0.16  0.45  -2.28  0.77  1.57 
Mauritius  0.22  0.42  0.57  0.59  0.90  -1.09  1.43  0.72 
Mozambique  0.04  0.18  0.52  0.22  -1.18  2.98  -0.39  -3.05 
Niger  0.03  0.79  0.25  0.10  0.79  1.82  -0.64  -0.09 
Rwanda  0.05  0.18  0.55  0.23  1.89  1.70  -0.02  0.68 
Senegal  0.08  0.38  0.45  0.27  0.87  -0.64  0.62  0.92 
South Africa  0.29  0.84  0.45  0.57  1.82  1.23  0.12  0.86 100 - KLENOW & RODRIGUEZ-CLARE 
g(YIL)  g(K/Y)  g(H/Y)  g(A) 
Y/L  K/Y  H/Y  A  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Swaziland  0.15  0.53  0.47  0.41  2.96  2.87  0.35  0.67 
Tanzania  0.03  0.59  0.37  0.08  2.08  1.80  0.05  0.77 
Togo  0.04  0.76  0.32  0.12  2.60  3.02  0.28  0.26 
Tunisia  0.26  0.46  0.42  0.81  3.22  -0.94  1.35  2.99 
Uganda  0.04  0.19  0.57  0.17  0.06  0.96  0.17  -0.74 
Zaire  0.03  0.24  0.54  0.14  0.42  4.19  -0.19  -2.45 
Zambia  0.07  1.31  0.34  0.12  -0.42  -0.07  1.43  -1.32 
Zimbabwe  0.10  0.61  0.38  0.26  1.50  -0.96  0.74  1.70 
Barbados  0.36  0.51  0.77  0.70  2.39  1.55  0.46  0.97 
Canada  0.92  0.97  0.85  1.05  1.88  0.64  0.94  0.80 
Costa Rica  0.27  0.50  0.58  0.64  1.17  1.68  0.50  -0.36 
Dominican  Rep.  0.21  0.48  0.51  0.55  2.16  2.33  0.33  0.28 
El Salvador  0.16  0.42  0.51  0.48  0.95  1.94  0.53  -0.79 
Guatemala  0.22  0.54  0.40  0.62  1.32  1.24  0.47  0.12 
Haiti  0.06  0.42  0.39  0.22  0.96  2.23  -0.07  -0.58 
Honduras  0.14  0.50  0.46  0.38  1.41  0.21  0.93  0.64 
Jamaica  0.14  0.93  0.39  0.28  0.34  1.23  0.56  -0.91 
Mexico  0.50  0.49  0.53  1.29  2.33  1.27  0.70  0.95 
Nicaragua  0.17  0.51  0.47  0.47  0.56  2.35  0.28  -1.31 
Panama  0.30  0.58  0.62  0.60  3.00  1.45  0.62  1.55 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.76  0.54  0.66  1.55  1.65  1.57  0.52  0.18 
United  States  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.30  0.56  1.27  0.04 
Argentina  0.44  1.11  0.51  0.64  1.11  1.38  0.57  -0.25 
Bolivia  0.17  0.81  0.42  0.35  2.11  0.57  0.48  1.38 
Brazil  0.32  0.70  0.40  0.77  2.73  0.32  0.36  2.26 
Chile  0.29  0.91  0.53  0.47  0.44  0.73  0.52  -0.43 
Colombia  0.27  0.53  0.51  0.68  2.10  0.33  0.84  1.31 
Ecuador  0.28  0.67  0.53  0.58  3.07  0.78  1.12  1.77 
Guyana  0.11  1.34  0.37  0.17  -1.80  1.58  -0.18  -2.82 
Paraguay  0.18  0.42  0.58  0.50  2.23  2.10  0.09  0.67 
Peru  0.24  0.70  0.54  0.47  1.02  1.45  1.05  -0.72 
Uruguay  0.30  1.22  0.48  0.43  0.17  1.34  0.87  -1.36 
Venezuela  0.54  0.74  0.49  1.07  -0.43  2.46  0.82  -2.74 
Bangladesh  0.13  0.24  0.52  0.55  1.73  -1.11  0.90  1.92 
Hong  Kong  0.49  0.57  0.74  0.88  5.49  0.53  1.08  4.39 
India  0.08  0.71  0.38  0.20  1.74  -0.70  1.07  1.53 
Indonesia  0.13  0.59  0.45  0.32  3.89  1.88  0.95  1.91 
Iran  0.41  0.73  0.39  0.97  1.29  3.35  0.68  -1.55 
Iraq  0.47  0.58  0.41  1.26  0.85  5.70  0.05  -3.26 
Israel  0.65  0.88  0.79  0.84  3.27  0.79  1.02  2.03 
Japan  0.56  1.35  0.60  0.63  5.30  2.01  0.51  3.53 
Jordan  0.46  0.34  0.61  1.39  5.00  2.34  0.95  2.69 
Korea, Rep.  0.31  0.58  0.76  0.54  5.37  2.32  1.77  2.54 The Neoclassical  Revival in Growth  Economics  ? 101 
g(YIL)  g(K/Y)  g(H/Y)  g(A) 
Y/L  K/Y  H/Y  A  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Malaysia  0.31  0.68  0.51  0.63  3.74  1.30  1.21  2.00 
Myanmar  0.04  0.39  0.42  0.14  2.64  0.36  0.46  2.08 
Nepal  0.07  0.35  0.38  0.27  2.25  1.36  0.09  1.21 
Pakistan  0.13  0.48  0.38  0.40  2.96  -0.31  0.76  2.68 
Philippines  0.13  0.53  0.66  0.26  1.41  2.18  0.76  -0.65 
Singapore  0.53  0.93  0.41  1.03  5.11  2.40  0.16  3.29 
Sri Lanka  0.17  0.35  0.69  0.45  1.87  0.63  0.84  0.85 
Syria  0.51  0.37  0.56  1.52  4.42  0.97  1.35  2.83 
Taiwan  0.38  0.51  0.73  0.75  5.30  1.76  1.52  3.03 
Thailand  0.14  0.53  0.55  0.33  3.70  0.87  0.62  2.66 
Austria  0.71  1.53  0.45  0.88  3.20  0.74  1.42  1.72 
Belgium  0.81  1.43  0.64  0.84  2.59  0.63  0.73  1.65 
Cyprus  0.41  1.11  0.54  0.58  4.12  0.49  1.33  2.88 
Denmark  0.71  1.49  0.73  0.66  1.91  0.58  0.26  1.32 
Finland  0.70  1.80  0.60  0.65  2.87  0.15  0.97  2.11 
France  0.80  1.47  0.45  1.04  2.79  1.16  1.02  1.29 
Germany,  W.  0.81  1.85  0.53  0.79  2.69  0.51  0.30  2.12 
Greece  0.48  1.25  0.50  0.65  4.60  1.41  0.94  2.97 
Iceland  0.69  1.10  0.59  0.91  2.46  -0.42  1.20  1.95 
Ireland  0.57  1.07  0.62  0.75  3.31  0.93  0.47  2.33 
Italy  0.80  1.51  0.43  1.04  3.60  0.44  0.85  2.72 
Malta  0.46  0.95  0.56  0.70  4.71  -1.08  1.18  4.69 
Netherlands  0.85  1.28  0.61  0.98  2.05  0.68  1.45  0.59 
Norway  0.85  1.49  0.73  0.79  2.80  0.18  2.35  1.10 
Portugal  0.34  1.21  0.34  0.60  3.40  0.93  0.83  2.18 
Spain  0.63  1.28  0.42  0.93  3.80  1.91  0.71  1.96 
Sweden  0.78  1.54  0.65  0.77  1.69  0.57  0.77  0.77 
Switzerland  0.88  2.03  0.55  0.80  1.57  1.03  0.86  0.26 
Turkey  0.21  0.79  0.37  0.48  3.19  1.23  0.41  2.04 
United  Kingdom  0.68  1.23  0.64  0.79  1.77  0.21  0.38  1.37 
Yugoslavia  0.34  1.52  0.48  0.41  3.97  1.44  1.25  2.11 
Australia  0.86  1.33  0.74  0.85  1.63  0.46  0.48  0.98 
Fiji  0.29  0.68  0.61  0.53  1.03  0.25  0.86  0.28 
New  Zealand  0.77  1.25  0.94  0.68  0.81  0.38  1.01  -0.14 
Papua N.  Guinea  0.10  1.08  0.26  0.23  1.59  2.77  -0.54  -0.03 
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N. GREGORY  MANKIW 
Harvard  University 
Instructors of macroeconomics  who teach their students  about economic 
growth  often  use  Solow's  version  of the  neoclassical  growth  model  as 
the starting point for discussion.  This model  shows  very simply how  an 
economy's  production  technology  and its rates of capital accumulation 
determine  its steady-state  level  of income  per person.  After presenting 
this  elegant  theory,  the  instructor  is  left  with  a nagging  question:  So 
what?  Does  this  model  really explain  why  some  countries  are rich and 
others are poor? Or does this model leave most of the action unexplained 
in a variable that has been called, at various times, total factor productiv- 
ity, the Solow  residual,  and "a measure  of our ignorance"? 
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growth  often  use  Solow's  version  of the  neoclassical  growth  model  as 
the starting point for discussion.  This model  shows  very simply how  an 
economy's  production  technology  and its rates of capital accumulation 
determine  its steady-state  level  of income  per person.  After presenting 
this  elegant  theory,  the  instructor  is  left  with  a nagging  question:  So 
what?  Does  this  model  really explain  why  some  countries  are rich and 
others are poor? Or does this model leave most of the action unexplained 
in a variable that has been called, at various times, total factor productiv- 
ity, the Solow  residual,  and "a measure  of our ignorance"? 104 *  MANKIW 
Several  years  ago,  David  Romer,  David  Weil,  and  I took  a  stab  at 
answering  this question using the rightly famous Summers-Heston  data- 
set.  At  one  point  in  our  paper,  we  offered  an  ordinary-least-squares 
regression  of income  per person  on the investment  rate and the popula- 
tion  growth  rate-two  variables  that  determine  an  economy's  steady 
state according  to the most basic Solow  model.  These variables entered 
the  regression  with  the  signs  that the  theory  predicts,  and  the  R2 was 
0.59. When  we  added  a crude proxy for human-capital accumulation  to 
the regression,  the signs  of the coefficients  remained consistent  with the 
theory, and the R2  rose to 0.78. This large R2  surprised us, in part because 
these  international  data are surely subject to measurement  error, which 
tends to bias the R2  downward.  Our measure of human-capital accumula- 
tion was  particularly crude.  Given this bias, therefore,  we took the high 
R2  as evidence  that there may be a good deal of truth to the basic neoclas- 
sical growth  model. 
The  weak  link  in  our  paper-and,  I would  argue,  in  most  of  the 
empirical literature on economic  growth-is  the identification  problem. 
Correlation  does  not  imply  causation,  even  in  the  Summers-Heston 
data. A high R2  in a regression  cannot establish,  for instance,  whether  a 
high investment  rate causes  a high level of income  (as the Solow  model 
predicts)  or vice  versa.  Nonetheless,  I have  always  found  the  high  R2 
reassuring when  I teach the Solow growth model.  Surely, a low R2  in this 
regression  would  have  shaken  my  faith  that  this  model  has  much  to 
teach us about international  differences  in income. 
This paper by Klenow and Rodriguez tries to cast doubt on the conclu- 
sion  we  reached,  but  surprisingly  it  does  not  do  so  by  attacking  our 
weak link. Discussion  of the identification problem is largely absent from 
this  paper.  Instead,  the  paper  points  out-completely  correctly-that 
our measure  of human-capital  accumulation  was very crude.  If only we 
had used  a better measure  of human capital, they argue, we would  have 
reached a different conclusion.  In particular, they claim that with a better 
measure  of human  capital, we would  have concluded  that the neoclassi- 
cal growth  model  explains  only  a small fraction of international  differ- 
ences  in income. 
At first glance,  this conclusion  seems  odd.  A standard result in econo- 
metrics  is  that  measurement  error reduces  an  equation's  explanatory 
power.  Adding  additional  information  should  always improve  an equa- 
tion's fit. How  is it that Klenow  and Rodriguez explain less than we did 
by bringing more information to bear on the problem? The answer lies at 
the heart of this paper. 
Klenow and Rodriguez employ  an empirical strategy that is fundamen- 
tally  different  from that used  in my  paper with  Romer and  Weil. Our Comment*  105 
approach was one of estimation.  That is, we used  ordinary least squares 
to find the parameters that best fit the cross-country data and then asked 
whether  these  estimated  parameters  made  sense  in  the  context  of  a 
Solow  growth  model  augmented  to include  human  as well has physical 
capital. By allowing  the data to choose  the parameters,  we  were  in es- 
sence  allowing  the model  to take its best shot.  By contrast, Klenow  and 
Rodriguez adopt an approach that is more similar to growth accounting. 
In particular, they calibrate the key parameters and then see how  much 
human-  and physical-capital  accumulation  can explain,  given  those  pa- 
rameter values. 
Their results are necessarily  sensitive  to the particular parameters they 
choose.  Unfortunately,  these  are not  parameters  about  which  anyone 
can be  greatly  confident.  These  authors  begin  in  their Table 1 with  a 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  physical  capital, human  capi- 
tal, and raw labor. It is straightfoward to calculate the sensitivity  of these 
results.  The amount  of international  income  variation attributed to hu- 
man capital in this table is simply proportional to /3(1 -  a -  3). Klenow 
and Rodriguez  use a = 0.30 and  3 = 0.28, which makes  //(1 -  a -  3) = 
0.67. Yet if we  assume  instead  that a = 0.35 and  3 = 0.50, then  //(1 -  a 
-  /)  = 3.33. In this case, the role of human capital in explaining interna- 
tional  income  differences  is  5  times  larger than  what  is  presented  in 
Table 1. I am not raising this issue  because I know that the parameters a 
=  0.35 and /3 =  0.50 are better than the parameters Klenow  and Rodri- 
guez  use.  Rather, I am suggesting  that we  don't really know  what  the 
right parameters  are with  much precision,  and that many of the results 
in this paper presume  that we  do. 
A  related  issue  is  how  we  combine  human-capital  accumulation  at 
different levels  of schooling.  Romer, Weil, and I used data for secondary 
schooling.  By contrast,  this  paper  takes  the  very  sensible  approach  of 
combining  the  secondary-school  data with  data on primary-school  and 
higher  education.  (The  more  important  addition  here  is  the  primary- 
school  data.  Higher  education  is  so  small  in  so  many  countries  that 
variation  in  it matters  much  less  in this  paper's  calculations.)  Klenow 
and Rodriguez  combine  these various data to produce a single summary 
measure  of human-capital  accumulation. 
Before  reading  this  paper,  I would  have  expected  that  Klenow  and 
Rodriguez's  measure of schooling  would  be better than the one we used. 
Yet, in  fact,  their  new  measure  does  a worse  job of  explaining  cross- 
country  differences  in  income.  They  report  that  their  sophisticated 
human-capital  measure has a correlation with income of only 0.52, while 
the cruder measure  that ignores  the primary-school  data has a correla- 
tion with income  of 0.84. 106 *  MANKIW 
How  could this be? Why is the crude measure  of human capital more 
correlated with  income  than the sophisticated  measure? One possibility 
is  that  the  sophisticated  measure  is  not  really  better  than  the  crude 
measure.  I can think of various reasons why  this might be the case. 
When  combining  different enrollment  rates, it is natural to produce  a 
measure  something  like average  years  of schooling.  This standard  ap- 
proach implicitly assumes,  however,  that a year of schooling  for a 7-year- 
old produces  as much human capital as a year of schooling  for a 15-year- 
old.  This assumption  may  not be right.  Certainly, both  students  make 
the  same  contribution  to the  society's  total years of schooling.  Yet one 
might argue that a year of schooling  for a 15-year-old in fact contributes 
more  to the  stock  of human  capital.  A natural measure  of the human- 
capital stock  is its  opportunity  cost-that  is,  the  output  that has  been 
forgone  as students  are put through school.  Because the market wage  of 
a 15-year-old is much  higher  than the market wage  of a 7-year-old,  the 
cost of a year of secondary  schooling  is much greater than that of a year 
of  primary  schooling.  From  this  perspective,  it  is  plausible  to  give 
greater weight  to secondary  enrollment  rates than primary enrollment 
rates when  computing  the aggregate  accumulation of human capital. 
It is also worth considering  what students  are doing when  they are not 
in school.  A 15-year-old who  is not at school is presumably working at a 
job. Thus, secondary-school  enrollment  represents the decision between 
work and education.  By contrast,  a 7-year-old not at school  might be at 
home  with  a parent.  This time may  at least partly represent  a form of 
home  schooling.  If so, international differences in primary-school enroll- 
ment might contain little information about human-capital accumulation. 
A clear example of this phenomenon  is the rise of day care in the United 
States. Many 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds  now  attend organized  day-care cen- 
ters rather than  staying  at home  with  a parent as they  did in the past. 
Should  we  say that this change  represents  an increase in human-capital 
accumulation,  or merely  a change  in child-care arrangement? Probably 
the latter. But perhaps  the same argument  applies  to 7-year-olds.  If one 
society  chooses  to keep  7-year-olds  at home  with  one-on-one  attention 
from parents,  while  another society  sends  them to primary schools  with 
classes of forty students  and one teacher, we should not be so quick to say 
that the first society  is deficient in human-capital  accumulation. 
Another  reason  we  might  want  to give  greater weight  to secondary 
schooling  than to primary schooling  involves  externalities.  The idea that 
human  capital  generates  positive  externalities  appears  in  many  recent 
discussions  of economic  growth  and is,  in my view,  very  appealing.  It 
explains,  for instance,  why  all countries  choose  to subsidize  education, Comment 107 
why  developing  countries are concerned  about the brain drain, and why 
good  students  prefer to be at schools with other good students.  Once we 
start thinking  about  externalities,  it  seems  unlikely  that  they  are the 
same  at all levels  of schooling.  One  externality often mentioned  is that 
educated  people  generate  good  ideas that enter society's pool of knowl- 
edge.  This externality  might  well  flow  largely from the most  educated 
members  of society. If so, differences in secondary and higher education 
would  be more important than differences  in primary education. 
I should  note  that  an  important  semantic  issue  arises  here.  When 
Klenow  and  Rodriguez  calibrate their model,  they  do  so using  the pri- 
vate return to schooling.  In their view,  externalities from human  capital 
are outside  the realm of the neoclassical  model; if such externalities are 
important,  that calls into doubt the neoclassical  revival. A broader view 
of the neoclassical  growth  model,  however,  is that it emphasizes  capital 
accumulation  as the key to growth,  and it can potentially  allow for such 
externalities.  Certainly, that is the view I have taken when  defending  the 
neoclassical  model  as a useful  theory of international  differences  in liv- 
ing standards. 
All of the issues  I have  raised point  to a single  conclusion:  We don't 
know  as  much  as  we  need  to  know  to  calibrate the  contribution  of 
human  capital to the production  process.  In particular, we  don't  know 
with much  precision  the share of income  that accrues to human  capital, 
we  don't  know  what  weight  to  attach  to  various  levels  of  education 
when  measuring  the  total stock of human  capital, and we  don't  know 
the social return to a year of schooling.  In the end,  therefore,  I am not 
convinced  by  this  paper's  central conclusion  that human  and  physical 
capital are incapable of explaining the bulk of international differences in 
income.  Put simply, this conclusion  is based on more assumptions  about 
unknown  parameters than I am willing  to swallow. 
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in growth  rates of per capita income  across countries  is associated  with 
variation in the growth  rate of capital and skills. Klenow  and Rodriguez 
associate  this  view  primarily  with  two  papers-Mankiw,  Romer,  and 
Weil (1992) (MRW) and  Young (1995)-but  Mankiw  (1995) summarizes 
this work and provides  the clearest statement  of the neoclassical  growth 
revival. 
Klenow and Rodriguez question both tenets of the neoclassical growth 
revival  and  argue  that  "the dominant  cause  of  the  large international 
dispersion  in  levels  and  growth  rates of output  per worker" is  differ- 
ences in (multifactor) productivity. I do not find much to disagree with in 
this  conclusion,  except  that it perhaps  overemphasizes  the importance 
of  productivity.  Indeed,  Hall  and  I have  argued  elsewhere  (Hall and 
Jones,  1996) that levels  of productivity  vary greatly across countries.  We 
use  a  slightly  different  methodology-for  example,  we  follow  Solow 
(1957) in not making  an assumption  about the exact functional  form of 
the  production  function-and  reach  the  same  conclusion.  Part of  the 
reason  why  the United  States has a higher GDP per worker than Ethio- 
pia  is  that  the  United  States  invests  more  in  physical  capital  and  its 
workers  have  a much  higher level  of education.  However,  a key part of 
the explanation  is also that the United States uses  its inputs  much more 
productively  than does  Ethiopia. 
My comments  are divided  into  two  parts.  The first part attempts  to 
clarify some  of the points  made  by Klenow  and Rodriguez.  In the pro- 
cess,  I will argue that it is not obvious  from the MRW evidence  that there 
should  have been a neoclassical  revival in the first place. The second part 
steps  back to consider  where  we  are in our understanding  of the differ- 
ences  in levels  and growth  rates of output  per worker across countries. 
2.  Should  There  Have  Been  a Neoclassical  Revival? 
My  first comment  is related  to interpreting  the  results  in Klenow  and 
Rodriguez's  Table 1, where  they  decompose  differences  in output  per 
worker across countries  into the contribution from productivity, A, and 
the contribution  from inputs,  X. Their summary  statistics are based  on 
the coefficients  obtained  from regressing  log A on log y and log X on log 
y, where  y denotes  GDP per worker. They interpret these  coefficients  as 
conditional  expectations:  if GDP per worker is higher  by one  percent, 
what  is our best  guess  as to how  much  higher productivity  and inputs 
are? 
These  coefficients  can be motivated  in a different way. For example, 
one  might  be concerned  with  how  much  of the variation in output  per Comment.  109 
worker across countries  is due  to variation in productivity  vs.  variation 
in inputs.  Since y = AX, the variance of log y, denoted  cr, can be written 
as the sum of the variances of log A and log X and their covariance: 
_y  =  o'  +  crx +  2(A,x. 
The problem with doing the variance decomposition  this way is that one 
encounters  covariance terms. 
The  regression  coefficients  reported  by  Klenow  and  Rodriguez  are 
estimates  of 
2A +  a,x  _T,  +  A,X 
bA - 
+ 
-  X  +  QA,X 
bx = 
Therefore,  bA and bx are a way  of summarizing  the variance decomposi- 
tion, where  the covariances are split evenly  among the factors. 
This is a useful way to summarize the variance decomposition,  particu- 
larly when  more than two factors are considered.  However,  it can some- 
times be slightly  misleading.  For example,  in the conference  version  of 
their paper  Klenow  and  Rodriguez  reported  a value  of bA of  -0.03  for 
their  replication  of  the  MRW results.  According  to  the  formula  just 
given,  this  is  possible  if the  variance  of log  A is  offset  by  a negative 
covariance between  log A and log X. In fact, this is what they reported. 
This implies,  however,  that the A's differ substantially across countries. 
A related point is made by considering  the original MRW results. They 
report that neoclassical inputs can explain a large fraction of the variation 
in output per worker across countries; the R2  from their regression of log 
y on the components  of log X is 0.78. While this is high,  this means that 
the variation in the residual is equal to 0.22 times the variation in log y. 
This residual  can be  interpreted  as  the  logarithm  of productivity,  and 
therefore, in the original MRW results, the standard deviation of log A is 
equal to (0.22)?.5  =  0.47 times  the  standard deviation  of log y. In other 
words,  even  MRW find  large  differences  in productivity  across  coun- 
tries.  We are left with  the  question:  Is even  the  MRW evidence  really 
consistent  with the tenets  of the neoclassical revival? 
My  second  specific  comment  is  related  to  the  results  reported  in 
Klenow  and  Rodriguez's  Table 4.  This  table  contains  their version  of 
growth  accounting,  based  on correlations of growth  rates of output  per 110 *  JONES 
worker with growth  rates in factor intensities.  They infer from this exer- 
cise  that  most  of  the  variation  in  growth  rates across  countries  is  the 
result of total factor productivity  (TFP) growth rather than growth in the 
inputs. 
I like the basic approach here, but I'd like to suggest  an alternative.  If 
all  countries  were  in  their  steady  states,  then,  as  is  well  known,  all 
growth would  be attributable to TFP growth.  In this sense,  the KR meth- 
odology  is in some ways  set up to deliver their result. An alternative way 
of  gauging  the  relative  importance  of  TFP growth  in  inputs  that  gets 
around  this  problem  is to ask how  much  of the exceptional  growth  in 
output  per worker is due to exceptional  productivity  growth and excep- 
tional capital deepening. 
This exercise  is carried out here using  the data from Young (1995), as 
reported  by  Klenow  and  Rodriguez.  Specifically,  I  assume  that  the 
world's  technological  frontier is growing  at an annual  rate of 1%. This 
number  is chosen  for convenience;  it is easy to see how  other numbers 
would  affect the results.  Then the growth  rate of output per worker can 
be  written  as  the  sum  of  the  growth  rate of  the  world  technological 
frontier, plus the exceptional  growth in A and the exceptional deepening 
(growth  in X). According  to the results  shown  here in Table 1, roughly 
half of the exceptional  (i.e.  faster than the world frontier) growth in the 
East Asian economies  is due to exceptional growth in A and roughly half 
is due to exceptional  growth in the intensity  of the inputs.  These results, 
together  with  the basic finding  (documented  in Table 2 of Klenow  and 
Rodriguez) that between  40% and 60% of the variation in levels is due to 
variation in A, lead me to conclude  that roughly  half of the variation in 
both levels  and growth rates of output per worker is due to productivity. 
I think  this is worth  emphasizing,  because  oftentimes  readers want  an 
all-or-nothing  answer,  and  they  may  be  tempted  to  conclude  from 
Klenow  and Rodriguez's  paper that "everything is productivity." A bet- 
ter answer,  I think,  is that both traditional inputs  and productivity  play 
large and important roles. 
Table  1  ACCOUNTING  FOR  MIRACLES 
Growth  Exceptional 
of world  Exceptional  A growth,  deepening, 
Country  gYIL  frontier (%)  gA -  1% (%)  gx (%) 
Hong  Kong  4.7  1  2.7  1.0 
Singapore  4.2  1  -0.7  3.9 
S. Korea  4.9  1  1.5  2.4 
Taiwan  4.8  1  2.5  1.3 Comment 111 
3.  Our  Current  State  of Knowledge 
I want  to end  my comment  with a discussion  of the current state of our 
knowledge  about  economic  growth.  One  of the important  goals  of the 
growth  literature is to provide  a formal characterization of the dynamic 
production  possibilities  of the economy,  that is, to provide a model  that 
specifies  an aggregate  production  function  Y =  F(K, H,  L, A,  . . . ) as 
well as how  the inputs  into production  evolve  over time. 
Different  papers  in  the  growth  literature characterize  this  dynamic 
PPF differently.  For example,  Solow's  (1957) paper was concerned  with 
figuring out the "shape" of the aggregate production function F(.), since 
Solow  (1956) recognized  that the  dynamics  of  the  neoclassical  growth 
model  hinged  on this function.  MRW can also be read as trying to pin 
down  the shape  of the aggregate production function within the class of 
Cobb-Douglas  production  functions. 
With hindsight,  estimating  the  parameters  of the  aggregate  produc- 
tion  function  econometrically  appears  to  be  impossible.  The  required 
identifying  assumption  is that one can separate shifts of the production 
function  from movements  along  the production  function.  In practice, I 
do  not  see  how  this  can  be  done.  For example,  to  use  instrumental 
variables,  one  needs  to  find  a variable  that  changes  the  capital  stock 
without  changing  the efficiency  with which  the capital is used.  In prac- 
tice, anything  that stimulates  capital is likely to stimulate productivity as 
well,  particularly if unmeasured  utilization is a problem. 
For this  reason,  I now  have  less  confidence  in modeling  the  aggre- 
gate  production  function  as  Y =  K'13H'3(AL)113,  as originally  suggested 
by  MRW.  In  addition,  Klenow  and  Rodriguez  claim  that  MRW are 
using  the  wrong  measure  of  human  capital  in  their  regression.  Had 
they  used  Klenow  and Rodriguez's  data, presumably  they would  have 
estimated  different exponents  for the  production  function.  Therefore,  I 
see no evidence  that the aggregate production  function  should  take this 
form.  Instead,  one  has  to  use  other  evidence  such  as  the  absence  of 
trends  in  factor  shares  to  try to  restrict the  shape  of  the  production 
function. 
An important  contribution  of Bils and Klenow  (1996) is to argue that 
the Mincerian wage  regressions  in the labor literature provide  a useful 
piece of evidence  to match in modeling  human capital. Like the absence 
of trends in factor shares,  this independent  evidence  tells us something 
about the way educational  attainment affects ouptut,  and it seems  to me 
that this is a superior way of characterizing the human capital portion of 
the dynamic  production  possibilities  of the economy. 
Based on these papers and on other work in the growth literature, one 112 *  JONES 
way  to describe  the dynamic  production  possibilities  frontier of econo- 
mies is 
Y = AK(hL)l-,  a  =, 
K=Y-C-SK, 
h =  eYS, 
A=  ? 
The first equation  is an aggregate  production  function in which  there is 
one  type  of  labor in  the  economy  with  a skill level  h determined  by 
educational  attainment.  I've simplified  the production  function  relative 
to  Klenow  and  Rodriguez  and  MRW. In fact,  workers  with  different 
skills are probably not perfect substitutes,  and the evidence  on changes 
in relative  wages  suggests  that maybe  technical  change  is skill-biased. 
However,  at this  point  in time,  I don't  think there is a clear candidate 
production  function  with  these  properties,  and growth  economists  are 
typically using  aggregate  measures  of human  capital that do not distin- 
guish  the skill levels  of different workers anyway. 
I've left the  modeling  of A unspecified.  For the growth  of A, Romer 
(1990),  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991),  and  others  have  provided  us 
with  very  nice  theories.1 About  the levels  of A we  know  much  less.  To 
the extent that one associates  productivity with ideas, models  of technol- 
ogy  diffusion  and  transfer are relevant.  However,  it seems  likely  that 
differences  in productivity  reflect more than simply  differences  in tech- 
nology;  for example,  Hall  and  Jones  (1996) find  that the  U.S.  level  of 
productivity  ranks 11th out of 133 countries. 
A suggestive  stylized  fact documented  both by Hall and Jones and by 
Klenow  and Rodriguez  is that productivity  and inputs  are highly  corre- 
lated across  countries.  Poor countries  have  low  levels  of education,  in- 
vestment,  and  productivity.  Rich countries  have  high  levels  of inputs 
and productivity.  This correlation suggests  that common  driving forces 
may  be  at work.  Hall  and  I document  that measures  of  the  extent  to 
which  the government  policies  and institutions  of the economy  discour- 
age diversion  and rent-seeking  can explain much of this correlation and 
provide  a  clear  empirical  explanation  for why  some  countries  are  so 
much richer and more productive  than others. 
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Discussion 
Robert King  began  the  discussion  by  asking  whether  it is  feasible  to 
create a more comprehensive  human-capital measure using measures  of 
educational attainment available from the United Nations,  then aggregat- 
ing using a reference wage rate. In particular, he noted that similar work 
has been done  in the past by Anne  Krueger, but that the data are proba- 
bly of higher quality now. 
Francesco  Caselli  observed  that panel-data  techniques  developed  to 
deal  with  omitted-variable  bias may  be  used  to identify  differences  in 
technology  across  countries.  In his own  work he has been  able to esti- 
mate  TFP directly  instead  of  having  to  rely  on  the  error term  for its 
identification.  His finding  is that the direct estimates  of TFP are highly 
variable  across  countries,  supporting  the  conclusions  of  Klenow  and 
Rodriguez. 
Susanto  Basu  pointed  out  that  the  paper  largely  ignores  issues  of 
capital  mismeasurement.  He  cited  work  by Jong-Wha Lee and  others 
that  attributes  most  of  the  growth  benefits  of  openness  to imports  of 
capital  goods.  This  result  suggests  that  embodiment  of  technological 
advances  in new  capital is important  to a degree  that may not be cap- 
tured very well in the Summers-Heston  data. 
John Haltiwanger  expressed  two  reservations.  First, he cited a paper 
by Baily, Hulten,  and  Campbell which  used  plant-level  data to decom- 
pose  aggregate  productivity  growth  into  its  sources.  Those  authors 
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identification.  His finding  is that the direct estimates  of TFP are highly 
variable  across  countries,  supporting  the  conclusions  of  Klenow  and 
Rodriguez. 
Susanto  Basu  pointed  out  that  the  paper  largely  ignores  issues  of 
capital  mismeasurement.  He  cited  work  by Jong-Wha Lee and  others 
that  attributes  most  of  the  growth  benefits  of  openness  to imports  of 
capital  goods.  This  result  suggests  that  embodiment  of  technological 
advances  in new  capital is important  to a degree  that may not be cap- 
tured very well in the Summers-Heston  data. 
John Haltiwanger  expressed  two  reservations.  First, he cited a paper 
by Baily, Hulten,  and  Campbell which  used  plant-level  data to decom- 
pose  aggregate  productivity  growth  into  its  sources.  Those  authors 114 *  DISCUSSION 
found  that half of U.S.  manufacturing  productivity  growth  in the 1980s 
was  due  to shifts  of employment  from less  productive  to more produc- 
tive plants.  Haltiwanger  conjectured that differences in the effectiveness 
of economies  in allocating  labor to the most  productive  technologies,  a 
factor not considered  by the authors,  could explain a significant portion 
of the variation in aggregate productivity  among countries.  Secondly, he 
noted  that  much  of the  discussion  of measurement  error in the  paper 
focused  on classical measurement  error. He pointed  out that many of the 
output  figures used  in the empirical work are derived in part from input 
data,  and  that this  and other  systematic  measurement  problems  might 
be the source of some  of the otherwise  puzzling  empirical results. 
Responding  to the  discussants'  point  that there is much  uncertainty 
about  the  right  number  to  choose  for  the  share  of  income  going  to 
human  capital, Klenow  noted  that they deal with this issue  explicitly by 
using  data on  the  returns  to education  to constrain  their choice  of the 
share parameter. In particular, they choose  the exponents  in the human- 
capital accumulation  technology  to match  the  estimated  Mincer coeffi- 
cients reported in the paper. Absent micro data for most of the countries 
in  their  sample,  he  suggested  that  this  approach  gives  a  reasonable 
bound  to  the  share.  Charles Jones pointed  out  that the  specific  value 
chosen  for the human-capital  share was not of great importance,  since it 
had few implications  for the results.  Klenow responded  that making the 
choice  of this parameter explicit was  important for facilitating the com- 
parison of their results with  those  of the previous  literature. 